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DEAD MAN'S PRIVILEGE: VINCE FOSTER
AND THE DEMISE OF LEGAL ETHICS
Michael Stokes Paulsen
INTRODUCTION
T HE facts are worthy of a Grisham legal thriller or a Shakespearean
tragedy, and seem to partake of elements of both. The web of
characters and events frames a story of political intrigue, ethical di-
lemmas, corruption and greed, honor and loyalty, friendship, an-
guished indecision, and, ultimately, death. But the story is real and
deadly serious: On July 20, 1993, Vincent Foster, Jr., the Deputy
White House Counsel and personal friend of President Bill Clinton
and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, finished lunch at his desk, left
his office in the West Wing of the White House, and drove to Fort
Marcy Park in suburban northern Virginia, where he took his own life
by putting a .38 caliber revolver in his mouth and shooting himself
through the head.1
It may seem callous, almost cruel, to think of such a human tragedy
in terms of its legal significance, but there is legal significance to this
suicide that cannot be ignored: Vince Foster killed a material witness
in a federal criminal investigation. It is quite possible he did so in part
with the deliberate object of preventing that material witness (him-
self) from testifying. Whatever his precise intent, Foster's suicide had
the inevitable effect of permanently silencing a potentially very impor-
tant witness in what has become the most notorious criminal investi-
gation of the decade: Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's varie-
gated inquiry into "Whitewater," "Travelgate," "Filegate," and
ancillary matters (related and unrelated) involving possible obstruc-
tion of justice by officials in the administration of President Clinton,
including the President and the First Lady.
Some of the events involved in Starr's investigation occurred long
after Foster's death (most famously, allegations that President Clinton
* Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My
thanks to Patrick Schiltz, John Nagle, Daniel Farber, Geoffrey Stone, Susan Wolf,
William Hodes, and David McGowan for their valuable comments and suggestions,
and to Jay Pralle for his resourceful research.
1. See Office of Independent Counsel, Report on the Death of Vincent W. Fos-
ter, Jr., In Re: Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association at 1-3, 18-19 (1997)
[hereinafter IC Report].
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committed perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with Paula
Jones's civil lawsuit for sexual harassment and Clinton's attempts to
cover-up his clandestine sexual relationship with twenty-two-year-old
White House intern Monica Lewinsky). One of the areas of inquiry
assigned to Starr was Foster's death itself.2 But Starr's investigation
initially was directed at events in which Vince Foster, as Deputy
White House Counsel, had been an important player: allegations
concerning White House efforts to prevent a criminal inquiry into the
Whitewater Development Corporation and Madison Guaranty matter
and, even more centrally, the suspicious firing of career White House
Travel Office employees allegedly to make room for Clinton relatives
and friends and the use of the FBI and the Department of Justice to
investigate the former employees ("Travelgate").3
By all accounts, Vince Foster was a highly skilled, unfailingly pro-
fessional, and scrupulously honest lawyer who, in his work for the
Clinton White House, became entangled in events of questionable le-
gality and rapidly became overwhelmed by the personal and profes-
sional pressures and public criticism associated with those events. 4
Nine days before his suicide, Foster, deeply distraught over matters at
work, sought legal advice from a private attorney, James Hamilton,
most likely concerning Foster's legal and ethical responsibilities with
respect to matters in which he had acted as Deputy White House
Counsel and which were expected soon to come under investigation
by Congress and perhaps eventually by an Independent Counsel.'
Five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Swidler &
Berlin v. United States,6 ruled on whether Foster's conversations with
Hamilton remained privileged following Foster's suicide, as against a
grand jury subpoena in a criminal investigation of events involving the
Whitewater and Travel Office matters. The Court speculated, not
without basis, that Foster may already have been contemplating sui-
cide at the time he went to Hamilton for legal advice (a premise that
would prove important to its legal analysis of the privilege issue):
In the case at hand, it seems quite plausible that Foster, perhaps al-
ready contemplating suicide, may not have sought legal advice from
Hamilton if he had not been assured the conversation was privi-
leged.7
What did Vince Foster tell his lawyer? A plausible theory, sup-
2. See id. at 8-9.
3. For a summary description of "Travelgate," see infra note 21; see also H.R.
Rep. No. 104-849, at 11-28 (1996) (discussing the history and investigation of Travel-
gate as well as the White House's response).
4. See infra Part I (discussing the legal-ethical dilemma likely confronting Foster
in the weeks leading up to his suicide).
5. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
6. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
7. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
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ported by much of the available evidence, is that Foster was an honest
lawyer who found himself trapped in a legal-ethical dilemma from
which he sensed, rightly, that there was no good escape. Foster, under
tremendous stress and (as the Court would later note) perhaps al-
ready contemplating suicide, did what his professional habits as a law-
yer indicated was the prudent course: he consulted a lawyer. It seems
quite plausible that James Hamilton, another careful professional,
confirmed what Foster likely had already figured out for himself. that,
as Deputy White House Counsel, Foster's "client" was neither Presi-
dent Bill Clinton nor Hillary Clinton, but the United States govern-
ment as an entity; that Foster had an affirmative duty to report to the
Attorney General or other appropriate Department of Justice offi-
cial-including an Independent Counsel, were one to be appointed-
any information he had concerning the possible involvement of any
federal official in criminal activity; that Foster could in any event be
compelled to testify before a federal grand jury or congressional in-
quiry concerning such matters; and that, in all probability, no attor-
ney-client, executive, or Fifth Amendment privilege would shield Fos-
ter from being compelled to testify fully and truthfully concerning the
possible criminal wrongdoing of others.'
Foster was in a terrible bind-one that obviously weighed on him
more heavily than those around him knew.9 Foster was personally
loyal to the Clintons, his long-time friends. But he was also an ethical
lawyer acutely aware of his professional obligations under the law.
Foster would not want to provide evidence harmful to the Clintons;
but he would not lie under oath either. Nor would he withhold from
government investigators material information concerning possible
criminal wrongdoing by others, where he had a legal duty to report
such information. For Foster, neither course-disclosure or silence-
was consistent with his character? He was trapped between a rock
and a hard place, and he chose a hard place.
Is it possible that Foster's suicide was in part a response to his ethi-
cal dilemma, and the depression to which it likely contributed? Is it
possible that Foster viewed suicide as a "way out" of his ethical box?
The pressures, emotions, and conflicts with which Foster obviously
was wrestling in the last days of his life make it impossible to disen-
tangle his motives for committing suicide. Almost certainly, though,
the underlying events and issues associated with his decision to seek
out legal advice were contributing factors to the state of mind that led
Foster to take his own life. If the Supreme Court is right that Foster
may already have been contemplating suicide at the time of his con-
versation with Hamilton, it is also possible-possible, not necessarily
& See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
9. See IC Report, supra note 1, at 101.
10. See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
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probable-that he expressed such suicidal thoughts to Hamilton. At
the very least, it is likely that Foster discussed his legal-ethical di-
lemma with Hamilton. Some of the emotional pressure associated
with the dilemma may have been part of that conversation; and the re-
sults of that conversation may in turn have heightened the emotional
pressure on Foster.
Might Foster and Hamilton have discussed whether their conversa-
tion would remain privileged even if Foster were to die? (We know
that they discussed Foster's desire that their conversation remain
privileged.)" Might Vincent Foster, Jr., an astute lawyer notwith-
standing the personal and professional crisis that engulfed him, have
concluded, with or without Hamilton's assistance, that his suicide
would permanently silence both him and his lawyer? Like the Su-
preme Court's speculation as to Foster's state of mind at the time he
sought legal advice, this too is only speculation-plausible specula-
tion, but speculation nonetheless.
If this (or something like it) was Foster's conclusion, the Supreme
Court effectively ratified it five years later in its decision in Swidler &
Berlin." In Swidler & Berlin, the Court held that the common law at-
torney-client privilege survives the death of the client and that no ex-
ception exists in the situation where information about attorney-client
communications is sought for a criminal grand jury investigation, even
where such information is assumed to be of substantial importance to
the investigation.13 The Court sustained a motion to quash a grand
jury subpoena, issued in connection with the investigation of Inde-
pendent Counsel Kenneth Starr, directed to Hamilton, instructing
Hamilton to produce his handwritten notes of his meeting with his
now-deceased client, Vince Foster.
The Court did not consider whether (and no party argued that) cli-
ent suicide might pose a different issue than that presented by de-
ceased clients generally. Implicitly, the Court's decision rejects any
such suggestion. The Court also did not consider whether (and no
party argued that) client suicide might pose a different case, especially
where the client's suicide might be shown to have been motivated, in
part, by a desire to destroy evidence-specifically, the availability of
the client's own testimony. Implicitly, though far less clearly, the
11. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402; Transcript of Oral Argument at 3,
Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192) (statement of attorney James Hamilton, petitioner)
("Before we began, Mr. Foster asked me if the conversation was privileged and, with-
out hesitation, I said that it was."); infra note 65.
12. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
13. The Court noted, without specifically embracing, the recognized exception to
the posthumous privilege where necessary to establish testamentary intent. See id. at
408. The Court also noted attorney Hamilton's concession that (in the words of the
Court) "exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights might warrant breaching the privilege," but explicitly declined "to reach this
issue." Id. at 408 n.3.
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Court's opinion seems to have rejected this position as well.
There is much that is vulnerable in the Court's opinion in Swidler &
Berlin: its assumption about the strength of the policy justification for
the attorney-client privilege generally; its empirically-questionable as-
sumptions about clients' expectations concerning privilege and confi-
dentiality; even its premises concerning the common law method as
applied to the development and modification of the law of privilege.
On the whole, however, the Court's legal analysis is not obviously
wrong, as far as it goes. Indeed, neither the dissent, nor the opinion of
the Court of Appeals below, nor the briefs and arguments of the Of-
fice of Independent Counsel persuasively refutes the majority opinion
on its own terms.
Still, it is hard to agree wholeheartedly with Swidler & Berlin, for
the Court's holding ignores facts that suggest a far more tangled web
of relevant and difficult legal-ethical issues than is reflected in the
workmanlike opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist. These
ethical issues should have counseled against embracing the sweeping
claim of a permanent post-mortem privilege. Yet neither the dissent,
nor the Court of Appeals, nor the Office of Independent Counsel sug-
gested any narrower ground for piercing the attorney-client privilege
than the one rejected by the Supreme Court. One is left with the
sense that the Court rejected a straw man and adopted a much
broader common law rule than is supported by policy, precedent or
the facts of the Vince Foster case.
This Article is about Vince Foster's ethical dilemma, the way he re-
solved it, the implications of that dilemma and the circumstances of
Foster's death for the question of post-mortem attorney-client privi-
lege, and the implications of the entire Vince Foster story-from di-
lemma to suicide to privilege-for legal ethics generally. I explore
first (in Part I) the thorny legal-ethical dilemma that apparently con-
fronted Foster shortly before his death and that may have been the
subject of his conversations with attorney James Hamilton. Against
this backdrop, I then examine and critique (in Part II) Swidler & Ber-
lin's holding that Foster's statements to Hamilton remain privileged
after Foster's death, irrespective of their potential relevance to a
criminal investigation or the fact of Foster's suicide and its possible
evidence-destroying motive.
Finally, I speculate (in Part III) about what may be the larger sig-
nificance of the events of 1993 and 1998 for the future of "legal ethics"
in American law. A lot has happened to the public ethos of "legal
ethics" in the mid-to-late 1990s-so much so that this period may
mark a watershed as important as Watergate. There is a sense in
which Foster's death in 1993, and the Court's decision in the Foster
case in 1998 (along with other extremely important public battles over
government officials' claims of executive and attorney-client privilege
1999]
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that same year, 4 and the related events surrounding President
Clinton's impeachment by the House of Representatives and trial by
the Senate), symbolically frame a transition from a post-Watergate
era in which legal ethics centrally included notions of public truthful-
ness, candor, and integrity to a post-Clinton era in which the dominant
themes and expectations underlying lawyering are fierce loyalty to the
client, confidentiality, privilege, and aggressive advocacy-even at the
expense of truth.
I. WHAT DID FOSTER KNOW?
First, a caveat: we do not know all the facts. Indeed, the very na-
ture of the Supreme Court's decision in Swidler & Berlin, sustaining
the claim of posthumous attorney-client privilege, means that we may
never know what Vince Foster shared with Hamilton about possible
illegal conduct of administration officials in connection with the
Whitewater and Travel Office matters. Foster took his knowledge to
the grave. What Foster told Hamilton is governed by Hamilton's duty
of confidentiality and, by virtue of the Court's holding, is permanently
protected from compelled disclosure. The District Court examined
Hamilton's notes in camera, but held them privileged. 15 The Court of
Appeals reversed, but its decision was in turn reversed by the Su-
preme Court.16 The Office of Independent Counsel never saw the
notes.
Still, it is possible to make educated guesses concerning what Foster
told Hamilton. The Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") subpoe-
naed Hamilton's notes because it believed the notes would contain in-
formation relevant to the OIC's inquiries into Foster's death and im-
mediate subsequent events, and also to the inquiries into Whitewater
and the Travel Office affair."i Foster had been involved in Whitewa-
ter matters both as a private attorney for the Clintons and, subse-
quently, in at least a limited role, as Deputy White House Counsel.
Prior to joining the administration, Foster had been a law partner of
Hillary Rodham Clinton and of convicted Whitewater figure (and
former Clinton administration Associate Attorney General) Webster
L. Hubbell at the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock." Foster had served
14. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
15. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402.
16. See id.
17. According to the OIC's brief, the grand jury subpoenas were initially issued
during the OIC's investigation into "activities connected to Mr. Foster's death and the
aftermath. The OIC subsequently received jurisdiction to investigate the Travel Of-
fice matter in March 1996, and the July 11 notes are likewise relevant and important
to that aspect of the OIC's grand jury investigation." Brief for the United States at 7
n.3, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192).
18. Webster Hubbell served as Associate Attorney General in the Clinton Ad-
ministration from January 1993 to April 1994. In December 1994, Hubbell pled guilty
to one count of willful tax evasion and one count of mail fraud in connection with
[Vol. 68
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as private attorney for Bill and Hillary Clinton in the 1992 transfer of
the Clintons' interest in the Whitewater Development Corporation to
the Clintons' partner in that enterprise, James McDougal (who was
subsequently convicted of eighteen counts of fraud in connection with
Whitewater). 9 While serving as Deputy White House Counsel, Fos-
ter had been involved in overseeing the preparations of the Clintons'
tax returns in April 1993, including several matters in connection with
the Clintons' sale of their interest in Whitewater.20
fraudulent overbilling and hiding of income while at the Rose Law Firm. He served
18 months in prison, and subsequently was indicted twice more. The first subsequent
indictment asserted charges of conspiracy, tax evasion, and mail fraud related to his
receipt of questionable payments for nonexistent legal work that may have been in
exchange for Hubbell's noncooperation with the Independent Counsel's investigation
of Whitewater. That indictment was dismissed by a district court judge as outside the
purview of the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction. See Ruth Marcus & Susan
Schmidt, Judge Dismisses Hubbell Tax Case, Wash. Post, July 2, 1998, at Al. How-
ever, the dismissal was reversed on appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The second
subsequent indictment, focusing on the initial Whitewater matters, was handed up on
November 13, 1998. The indictment charged that Hubbell "'falsified, covered up by
scheme and concealed from agents and investigators ... the true nature of his ... rela-
tionships... [with] Madison Guaranty, Madison Financial and a series of transactions
that came to be known as the IDC/Castle Grande transactions."' Pete Yost, Starr In-
dicts Webster Hubbell, AP Online, Nov. 13, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 22418374
(quoting indictment). Hubbell pled guilty to one felony count of lying to investigators
and one misdemeanor count of tax evasion, but as part of the plea agreement received
no additional prison time. Glenn R. Simpson, Hubbell Set to Make Guilty Plea, Wall
St. J., June 29, 1999, at A16; Roberto Suro & Bill Miller, Starr Notes Scandal Erhaus-
tion at Hubbell Pleading, Wash. Post, July 1, 1999, at A2.
19. See Brief for the United States at 5 n.2, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192) (setting
forth Foster's activities); Glenn R. Simpson, Three Defendants in Whitewater Case are
Found Guilty on Fraud Charges, Wall St. J., May 29, 1996, A3 (noting Whitewater
convictions of James McDougal, Susan McDougal, and Arkansas Governor Jim
"Guy" Tucker, who had been Bill Clinton's Lieutenant Governor when Clinton was
Governor).
20. Brief for the United States at 5 n.2, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192). While
Foster served as Deputy White House Counsel, Whitewater documents had been
kept in his White House office. Department of Justice investigators had sought to re-
view these documents the day after Foster's death, but White House officials did not
allow them to do so. See i.
There was an apparent conflict of interest in Foster's private representation of the
Clintons and his subsequent involvement as a government attorney in matters con-
cerning Whitewater. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11(c) (1998)
("Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer
or employee shall not: (1) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employ-
ment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, author-
ized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter."). It is not clear whether Foster under-
stood that such a possible conflict of interest existed, though it seems likely that he
did. Foster expressed concerns as a general matter with the use of government law-
yers to handle arguably personal business for government officials, including the
Clintons. See Susan Schmidt, Depositions, Interviews Hint at Foster's Worries: Ethics
May Have Troubled White House Lawyer, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1995, at A6 [hereinaf-
ter Schmidt, Depositions, Interviews Hint at Foster's Worries] (recounting testimony of
Foster friend and attorney James Lyons that "'Foster believed that private sector at-
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Even more important than Foster's connections to Whitewater,
however, was the fact that Foster had been very significantly involved
in the White House's deliberations and decisions concerning the firing
of the Travel Office employees-the scandal that came to be known
as "Travelgate."21 Foster ordered the outside audit of the Travel Of-
fice that led to the firings. Foster directly supervised Associate Coun-
sel William Kennedy, who instigated the FBI investigation of Travel
Office employees (of which Foster was aware). Foster spoke in ad-
vance of the firing decision with Mr. David Watkins, Assistant to the
President for Management and Administration, who eventually car-
ried out the firings. Foster directed that Watkins keep Hillary Clinton
informed of all activities in connection with the Travel Office investi-
gation and audit. Foster also spoke, in advance of the firings, to Hil-
torneys should be handling many of the matters they were handling, both for ethical
and workload reasons').
21. The essence of the "Travelgate" affair is as follows. At the behest of Clinton
friend and Hollywood producer Harry Thomason (whose air consulting firm had
worked closely with the 1992 Clinton campaign) and Clinton third-cousin and White
House aide Catherine Cornelius (who desired to head the Travel Office and install a
Little Rock travel agency that included Clinton friends and campaign contributors as
the White House travel agent), David Watkins, a campaign official who had taken
charge of White House administration, authorized Cornelius to "keep her eyes and
ears open" about rumors of petty cash discrepancies and improper bookkeeping in
the Travel Office. Thomason informed Hillary Rodham Clinton of the rumors (ap-
parently generated by Thomason, Cornelius, and Thomason's business partner in the
air consulting firm, Darnell Martens), and the White House Counsel's office was
brought in. Vince Foster and Associate Counsel William Kennedy worked on the
matter. Kennedy brought in the FBI to investigate the Travel Office, even though the
FBI initially said their was insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation. Foster
sought an outside audit, and apparently argued against firing the Travel Office em-
ployees until one was completed. Foster directed that Watkins keep Hillary Rodham
Clinton informed of all events associated with the Travel Office matter.
After KPMG Peat Marwick found problems in the Travel Office and a petty cash
discrepancy, Watkins ordered the entire Travel Office staff fired and the White
House announced publicly that the FBI had launched a criminal investigation. The
Little Rock travel agency moved in quickly to set up a White House operation, but
soon abandoned the effort in the face of mounting press and public criticism over the
circumstances of the Travel Office firings. A later congressional investigation re-
vealed evidence, in the form of a contemporaneous memorandum by Watkins, that
Mrs. Clinton, who had denied any connection to the decision to fire the Travel Office
employees, in fact had directed that the firings occur. A White House internal "man-
agement review" concluded in early July 1993 that mistakes of judgment were made,
but that no one behaved in a seriously improper manner. Kennedy received a repri-
mand. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-849, at 11-28 (1996); Michael K. Frisby, Clinton Fires
White House Travel Office, FBI Is Probing Allegations of Kickbacks, Wall St. J., May
20, 1993, at A5; Michael Isikoff & Bill Turque, Snow Job?, Newsweek, Jan. 22, 1996,
at 30-31; Toni Locy, For White House Travel Office, a Two-Year Trip of Trouble,
Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1995, at A4; A Stealthy, Evasive Confession, N.Y. Times, July 11,
1993, § 4, at 18.
Five of the fired employees eventually were reinstated to other government jobs.
One retired. The director of the office, Billy Dale, was prosecuted by the Justice De-
partment, but acquitted of all charges. See Former Boss of Travel Office is Acquitted,
Tampa Trib., Nov. 17, 1995, at 2.
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lary Clinton, who expressed to Foster her strong desire (which Foster
relayed to Watkins) that the Travel Office situation be taken care of
as quickly as possible by firing the career employees.' In short, Fos-
ter appears to have been a central go-between among all the major ac-
tors in the Travel Office affair-Mrs. Clinton, David Watkins, Associ-
ate Counsel William Kennedy, the FBI-and was the highest ranking
administration legal official involved in overseeing the administra-
tion's actions.
The Independent Counsel's brief in Swidler & Berlin notes that
Foster thus would have been
a significant witness in the [Travel Office] investigation: He had
talked to Mr. Watkins about the Travel Office prior to the firings,
and he was one of only a handful of persons known to have talked
with Mrs. Clinton about the matter. If alive, Mr. Foster would have
been in a position to provide valuable information, whether inculpa-
tory or exculpatory. In light of Mr. Foster's death, the communica-
tions from Mr. Foster to Mr. Hamilton on July 11, 1993 would be
important in understanding Mr. Foster's role in the Travel Office
events and in understanding the roles of others-and thus in deter-
mining whether individuals made false statements, committed per-jury, obstructed justice, or committed other federal crimes33
It is also known that Foster was, at the time he sought out Hamil-
ton, deeply distressed over the Travel Office matter and the resulting
investigations and public disclosures-especially with the effect of
these matters on his own reputation for integrity. In a report by Dr.
Alan Berman, Executive Director of the American Association of
Suicidology, prepared at the request of the Office of Independent
Counsel, concerning Foster's state-of-mind at the time of his death,
Foster's concern over the Travel Office matter and his professional
reputation are treated as extremely important factors contributing to
the state-of-mind that led to Foster's suicide. Dr. Berman noted that
descriptions of Foster's personality by a wide variety of persons inter-
viewed "'were extraordinarily consistent in describing a controlled,
private, perfectionistic character whose public persona as a man of in-
tegrity, honesty, and unimpeachable reputation was of utmost impor-
tance."'24
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. A memorandum written by Mr.
Watkins in 1993 stated that "'[tihe First Lady took interest in having the Travel Office
situation resolved quickly... [Vince] Foster regularly informed me that the First
Lady was concerned and desired action-the action desired was the firing of the
Travel Office."' H.R. Rep. No. 104-849, at 41.
23. Brief for the United States at 6, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192).
24. Report to the Office of Independent Counsel, submitted by Dr. Alan L Ber-
man, Ph.D. at 3 [hereinafter Berman Report], cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 98;
see also Schmidt, Depositions, Interviews Hint at Foster's Worries, supra note 20 ("The
document archive on Foster released this month by the Senate Banking Committee is
in part a collection of impressions about his final days. It is clearly a portrait of a
1999]
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Foster had lived almost his entire adult life, and his entire profes-
sional life, in Little Rock, until he moved to Washington in January
1993. Foster was graduated first in his class at the University of Ar-
kansas Law School in 1971. He joined the Rose Law Firm as an asso-
ciate that year, becoming a partner in 1974 and staying with the firm
until January 1993-a tenure of twenty-two years, from age twenty-six
to age forty-eight2 His family did not initially move to Washington
with him, but arrived six months later, in June 1993 (a little over a
month before his suicide).26 Dr. Berman observed that Foster's life,
after arriving in Washington, "was filled with long, intense and de-
manding hours of work."' 7 During much of that time, with his family
remaining in Arkansas, he did not have access to his usual network of
personal support.
His professional life in Washington was not happy-a change from
his comfortable years in Arkansas. The legal and political issues with
which he was involved during his six months in the White House were
stressful, not always very successful in outcome, and exposed Foster to
unaccustomed public criticism. They included the selection and vet-
ting of three candidates for Attorney General, of a Supreme Court
Justice, and of other personnel. As the Independent Counsel's report
on Foster's death notes, some of these matters "developed into diffi-
cult situations abounding with unfavorable public comment."2 Other
issues included the Clintons' tax returns (including issues concerning
the sale of their interest in Whitewater to James McDougal), litigation
related to the Health Care Task Force and, of course, the dismissal of
the White House Travel Office employees and the resulting fallout.29
Foster also became embroiled in a controversy concerning his (and
other administration officials') membership in a Little Rock country
club that had no black members. Foster eventually resigned his mem-
bership in the wake of the controversy. 0 During that first six months
of the Clinton Administration, the White House staff-including Fos-
ter personally-was subjected to a barrage of media criticism on a
wide range of issues, suggesting that the staff was incompetent.3 The
public pressure in connection with Travelgate, including demands for
appointment of an Independent Counsel, crescendoed steadily from
proud man and careful lawyer who followed Clinton from Little Rock to the White
House and was soon humiliated by bad press and his own missteps.").
25. See IC Report, supra note 1, at 17.
26. See id. at 18.
27. Berman Report at 3, cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 98.
28. IC Report, supra note 1, at 103.
29. See id. at 103.
30. See id. at 104.
31. The Editorial Page of The Wall Street Journal singled-out Foster for criticism
in two June 1993 editorials. Who Is Vincent Foster?, Wall St. J., June 17, 1993, at A10;
Vincent Foster's Victory, Wall St. J., June 24, 1993, at A12.
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June to mid-July.3Y
In a letter to a friend in Arkansas, Foster wrote in March of 1993
that he had "never worked so hard for so long in my life. The legal is-
sues are mind boggling and the time pressures are immense.... The
pressure, financial sacrifice and family disruption are the price of pub-
lic service at this level. As they say, 'The wind blows hardest at the
top of the mountain."' 33 According to Dr. Berman's report, Foster
"uncharacteristically... talked of quitting,"3 but thought that doing
so and returning to Little Rock would be a "humiliation." s Accord-
ing to Foster's brother-in-law, former U.S. Representative Beryl An-
thony (Foster lived with his sister and brother-in-law in Washington
prior to his family's move to the capital in June), Foster had expressed
chagrin that he had "'spent a lifetime building [his] reputation' and
was 'in the process of having it tarnished."'
In early May of 1993, in the midst of the Little Rock country club
controversy and the beginnings of the Travel Office scandal, Foster
returned to Arkansas to give the commencement address at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas Law School, his alma mater. Dr. Berman later
characterized the address as "'replete with reflections upon and regret
regarding the changes wrought by his experiences in Washington."' '
Foster emphasized the importance of a lawyer's reputation for integ-
rity: "Dents to the reputation in the legal profession are irreparable,"
he said. "[N]o victory, no advantage, no fee, no favor... is worth
even a blemish on your reputation for intellect and integrity." He
added that the "reputation you develop for intellectual and ethical in-
tegrity will be your greatest asset or your worst enemy."-, At some
point, probably shortly before his death, Foster wrote a note, which he
apparently tore up, saying that he had "made mistakes from igno-
rance, inexperience and overwork." The note continued that Foster
"was not meant for the job or the spotlight of public life in Washing-
ton. Here ruining people is considered sport. '39 In legislation enacted
32- See, e.g., Who Is Vincent Foster?, Wall St. J., June 17, 1993, at A10; Vincent
Foster's Victory, Wall St. J., June 24, 1993, at A12; A Stealthy, Evasive Confession,
N.Y. Times, July 11, 1993, § 4, at 18; The Travel Office Controversy Isn't Over, Wash.
Times, July 12, 1993, at F2; Appoint Special Counsel, USA Today, July 19, 1993, at
10A. Foster met with attorney Hamilton on July 11, 1993, the morning of the New
York Times article referenced here. Foster committed suicide the day after USA To-
day called for an Independent Counsel to investigate the Travel Office affair.
33. IC Report, supra note 1, at 104.
34. Berman Report at 13, cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 99.
35. Berman Report at 14, cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 99.
36. IC Report, supra note 1, at 105 (quoting Anthony interviews).
37. Berman Report at 5, cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 98-99.
38. See id; see IC Report, supra note 1, at 105. Foster's speech also warned that
there would be "'failures, and criticisms and bad press and lies, stormy days and
cloudy days."' He counseled the graduates that, if they should find themselves "'get-
ting burned out or unfulfilled, [or] unappreciated,"' they should "'have the courage to
make a change."' Id. at 106.
39. IC Report, supra note 1, at 106-07. For the full text of the note, see infra note
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on July 2, 1993, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") was as-
signed to investigate the Travel Office firings-firings in which, it had
been publicly reported, Foster had had a hand."
It was in the midst of this political, legal, and personal maelstrom
that Foster sought legal advice from James Hamilton of the Washing-
ton law firm of Swidler & Berlin. The record in Swidler & Berlin
shows that the general subject matter of Vince Foster's conversations
with James Hamilton in July of 1993 concerned Hamilton's legal rep-
resentation of Foster in connection with expected investigations by
congressional committees, the General Accounting Office, and possi-
bly the Department of Justice in connection with the Travel Office
matter (and perhaps other matters as well).41 From the facts and cir-
cumstances that are known, it can fairly be surmised that Foster was
concerned about his own legal and professional obligations and poten-
tial liability under the circumstances-especially with respect to the
Travel Office matter-and that these concerns figured prominently in
his decision to seek private legal counsel from Mr. Hamilton.42
If this information is accurate, it is probable that Vince Foster, in
the days shortly preceding his suicide, found himself confronted with,
and sought advice concerning, a classic problem of legal ethics: What
is the in-house lawyer's duty when confronted with wrongdoing by of-
ficials of the entity the lawyer represents? What are the lawyer's du-
ties, and potential liability, where the lawyer's own actions may have
provided assistance to official wrongdoing? And are such duties af-
64. The note had been torn up, apparently discovered in Foster's briefcase several
days after Foster's suicide, and was turned over to investigators by White House
Counsel Bernard Nussbaum.
40. See IC Report, supra note 1, at 106.
41. See Brief for the United States at 3, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192); Joint Ap-
pendix at 5, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192).
42 See IC Report, supra note 1, at 106 & n.336 ("During the week of July 12, Mr.
Foster contacted private attorneys seeking advice in connection with the Travel Of-
fice incident."). This simple declarative statement is based upon reports of witness
interviews that, apparently, provided information (perhaps second-hand reports from
Foster) concerning the nature of the representation sought. The referenced witness
statements include two interviews with Beryl Anthony, Foster's brother-in-law, and
with James Lyons, a Denver attorney who had worked on Whitewater issues for the
Clinton campaign and with whom Foster had worked in the past. According to Ly-
ons, just days before Foster's suicide (and, apparently, after Foster's meeting with
James Hamilton), Foster called Lyons, asking if Lyons could come to Washington on
short notice because Foster was considering asking him (Lyons) to serve as Foster's
personal attorney in connection with the Travelgate inquiries. The meeting was set to
occur on Wednesday, July 21, 1993-the day after Foster committed suicide. See
Schmidt, Depositions, Interviews Hint at Foster's Worries, supra note 20.
Lyons did not invoke attorney-client privilege concerning these conversations with
Foster, apparently because he either did not believe that an attorney-client relation-
ship had been created, because he did not believe that the conversations involved Ly-
ons in his capacity as an attorney, because he did not believe that Foster intended the
conversations to be confidential, because he did not believe the privilege survived
Foster's death, or because it simply did not occur to him to invoke the privilege.
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fected by the special context of an attorney's representation of the
government, rather than the more common context of an in-house at-
torney for a corporation (and, if so, how)?
From the standpoint of legal ethics, these questions are, in theory,
not especially difficult. A lawyer's ethical duty of loyalty when repre-
senting an organizational client, like a corporation, is to the organiza-
tion, not to individual officers within the organization, who may have
interests in conflict with those of the organization itself and who may
not always act in the best interests of the organization. While an or-
ganization acts through its duly authorized officers, and the interests
of the organization ordinarily are determined by these officers (when
acting within the lawful sphere of their powers), that does not obviate
the fact that the lawyer for the entity represents the entity, not the of-
ficers. This is elementary law of agency and legal ethics.43
This principle applies to government attorneys the same as to attor-
neys representing any other type of organizational client. The gov-
ernment lawyer's client is the United States government, not any par-
ticular government official. Even the "Deputy Counsel to the
President" does not represent the President personally. His client is
the executive branch of the United States government. To borrow the
corporate analogy, he works in the General Counsel's office of "USA,
Inc." His particular area of job responsibility within the corporation
may be advancing (within the bounds of the law) the political and le-
gal interests of the President as CEO of USA, Inc., and he will there-
fore be particularly sensitive to defend the power of present manage-
ment to pursue its lawful policy and political objectives, in the
interests (as determined by present management) of USA, Inc. Ulti-
mately, however, the Deputy Counsel to the President represents the
office, not the officer; his client is the organization, not the individual
interests of the person who happens to hold the office of President of
the United States.'
Vince Foster was a good lawyer. He probably knew all this. His
judgment may have been clouded, however (as he himself appeared to
suspect) by public criticism, overwork, pressure, inexperience with
work as a government lawyer,45 and perhaps also by his personal and
43. See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 and cmt. (1998)
(setting forth an attorney's ethical obligation to the organization over that of the or-
ganization's officers).
44. I have set forth this analysis, and the corporate analogy, at greater length
elsewhere. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-
Client Privilege?, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 485-493 (1998) [hereinafter Paulsen, Who
"Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?] Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hell,
Handbaskets, and Government Attorneys: The Duty of Loyalty and its Limits, 61 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 83, 99-100 (Winter 1998) [hereinafter Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets,
and Government Attorneys].
45. See IC Report, supra note 1, at 106-07 (quoting torn-up note found in Foster's
briefcase after his death).
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political loyalties to the Clintons. The problem is a familiar one: cor-
porate attorneys often owe their positions to present management and
are personally loyal to the individuals holding positions as officers of
the corporation, with whom they work closely and personally on a
daily basis. The corporation is a legal fiction. It is easier for lawyers
to identify with the interests of individuals than of fictitious legal con-
structs. The principle that the corporate attorney represents the cor-
poration, not the officers, is often a hard one for the corporate attor-
ney faithfully to apply in the real world. The legal ethics texts are
replete with examples of violation of this principle, sometimes in cir-
cumstances where it is easy to sympathize with the lawyer's misidenti-
fication of the client as being the officers rather than the entity.46 But
it remains clear, unambiguous black letter law.47
Once this framework is understood, the answers to the questions
concerning the in-house lawyer's proper response to unlawful conduct
by officers of an entity-client become relatively easy-and are, in any
event, spelled out in detail in bar ethics rules and, often, in applicable
substantive law as well. In the words of Model Rule 1.13(b) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
when a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee
or other person associated with the organization is engaged in ac-
tion, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the repre-
sentation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization,
or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the or-
ganization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organi-
zation, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization.48
46. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Susan F. Koniak & Roger C. Cranton, The Law and
Ethics of Lawyering 99-125, 300-13, 747-96 (2d ed. 1994).
47. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (1998) ("Because the or-
ganization is the client, the lawyer owes his or her obligations to the organization it-
self and not to the organization's constituents."); see generally, Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct § 1.13, at 395-416 (1992 & Supp. 1996) (describing attorney's
duty to corporation, including situation where attorney becomes aware of violation of
law); Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §§ 8.3.2, 13.7.2 (1986) (same).
Vince Foster's past representation of Bill and Hillary Clinton, in their individual
capacities, in connection with the sale of their interest in Whitewater to James
McDougal created a conflict of interest that probably should have prevented him
from representing the executive branch ("USA, Inc."), including the interests of the
incumbent President, in connection with Whitewater matters. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.11(c) (1998). The extent of Foster's involvement in
Whitewater issues in his capacity as Deputy White House Counsel is unclear as a fac-
tual matter. Short of an actual conflict of interest in violation of ethics rules, however,
it seems evident that Foster's past private representation of the Clintons, together
with his close personal association with them, may have led Foster, like many other
in-house counsel, too readily to identify with the individual officers of the entity (the
Clintons) as his "client," rather than the entity itself (the government of the United
States of America).
48. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(b) (1998) (emphasis added).
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The Rule goes on to explain that "[i]n determining how to pro-
ceed," the lawyer should consider the seriousness of the violation, the
responsibilities and apparent motivation of the person or persons in-
volved, "the policies of the organization concerning such matters,"
and, the Rule adds (somewhat unhelpfully), "any other relevant con-
siderations."4 9 The Rule directs that whatever measures are taken
should minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of re-
vealing the information in question to persons outside the organiza-
tion, and recommends such measures as (1) asking the officials in-
volved to reconsider their action, (2) advising that an outside legal
opinion be sought, and (3) "referring the matter to higher authority in
the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the mat-
ter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the or-
ganization as determined by applicable law."s
This ethics rule has a specific statutory analogue in the case of the
federal government lawyer who learns of illegal conduct by officials
within the administration he or she serves. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) makes
reasonably clear "the policies of the organization concerning such
matters" (the "organization" here being the government of the United
States of America). Section 535(b) imposes an affirmative duty on
government lawyers-indeed, on all offices and agencies within the
executive branch-to report any "information, allegation, or com-
plaint" relating to violations of federal criminal law "involving Gov-
ernment officers and employees" to the Attorney General or other
person specifically assigned responsibility to perform an investigation
with respect to such matters. This statute in effect designates the At-
torney General as the "highest authority that can act in behalf of the
organization" in such matters,51 and thus the person within the corpo-
rate governance structure of USA, Inc. to whom the government at-
torney should report misconduct by other government officials--ex-
cept, of course, where an Independent Counsel has jurisdiction?2 If
49. Id.
50. Id
51. See id. Of course, as a matter of constitutional law, the President is the highest
official of the executive branch and the nation's chief federal law enforcement official.
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) should be understood as making the Attorney General the
President's designee for purposes of receiving information concerning unlawful ac-
tions by government officials. See Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-
Client Privilege?, supra note 44, at 508.
52. Section 535(b) requires that the report be made to the Attorney General, un-
less "the responsibility to perform an investigation with respect thereto is specifically
assigned otherwise by another provision of law." 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. §
594(a) provided (until recently) that an Independent Counsel exercises the full power
and responsibilities of the Attorney General in matters within the Independent Coun-
sel's jurisdiction. This provision most likely has the effect of making the reporting
duty of section 535(b) run to the Independent Counsel, not to the Attorney General,
in matters within the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction. As an original matter, the
duty of executive branch employees (including attorneys) to report possible wrong-
doing by executive branch officials to an executive branch officer not subject to the
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Vince Foster, acting as Deputy White House Counsel, became aware
of likely violations of federal criminal law by White House officials,
including the President or the First Lady, his ethical and legal duties
were clear: He was obliged to report such information to the Attor-
ney General or, had one been appointed at the time, to an Independ-
ent Counsel with jurisdiction over the matter. 3
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct go on to address the
situation where, despite the organizational lawyer's taking the rec-
ommended steps, the "highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a
violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the or-
ganization."' In such a case, "the lawyer may resign in accordance
with Rule 1.16." 55 The word "may" is a bit misleading, however, since
the referenced rule, Rule 1.16, provides that the lawyer "shall with-
draw from the representation" if "the representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law. ' '" 6
Significantly, such a violation of the ethics rules, and frequently of
other law, occurs whenever an in-house attorney assists or furthers
unlawful conduct by officers or employees of the organization to the
detriment of the legal interests of the organization. Assisting such
persons in unlawful conduct violates both an attorney's duty to the or-
ganization (Model Rule 1.13) and the ethical duty not to assist a cli-
ent's (or anyone else's) criminal or fraudulent conduct (Model Rule
1.2(d)). A violation of the latter duty frequently is also a criminal act
or a civil fraud, exposing the aiding-and-abetting attorney to other le-
direction and control of the President might well be considered unconstitutional, but
the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988), has
rejected that premise. See Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client
Privilege?, supra note 44, at 481-93; Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and Government
Lawyers, supra note 44, at 100 n.38;.
The D.C. Circuit, in the course of rejecting the claim of governmental attorney-
client privilege by Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey as a defense to a sub-
poena to testify before a Grand Jury in an Independent Counsel investigation, ap-
peared to accept, at least for purposes of argument, the claim that 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
does not in terms apply to the Office of the President. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d
1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of
Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). The Court nonetheless concluded that,
at a minimum, the provision "suggests that all government employees, including law-
yers, are duty-bound not to withhold evidence of federal crimes." Id.
53. As of late spring and early summer 1993, an Independent Counsel had not yet
been appointed. However, congressional investigations of "Travelgate" had begun,
and it was clear that some members of Congress, as well as some voices in the media,
would be pressing for appointment of an Independent Counsel to investigate the mat-
ter. See Appoint Special Counsel, supra note 32; Ann Banzer, White House Admits it
Goofed, San Diego Union Trib., July 3, 1993, at A18; Appoint Special Counsel, USA
Today, July 19, 1993, at 10A.
54. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(c) (1998).
55. Id.
56. Id. Rule 1.16 (a)(1).
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gal sanctions as well.' Perhaps most significant of all, "assistance" in
the underlying illegality, sufficient to impose ethical and substantive
legal liability on the attorney, can consist of tacit acquiescence in the
unlawful actions of clients or officers of the organization. Such acqui-
esence, which may consist of nothing more than the lawyer's silence
when the lawyer has a duty to speak, when done with knowledge that
the acquiescence or silence will further the underlying illegal act or
scheme (by preventing its detection), may constitute unlawful aiding
and abetting of the primary illegality.5s
It follows that a lawyer's continued representation of a corporation
or other organizational client, where the highest authority empowered
to act on behalf of that organization insists on continuation of a course
of unlawful conduct (including covering up past criminal or fraudulent
conduct), is unethical.59 In such a situation, a lawyer cannot carry out
the wishes of management consistent with his or her duty to represent
the interests of the organizational client. Such representation almost
unavoidably would involve ethical and legal violations by the attor-
ney-if indeed the representation has not already created such a situa-
tion.
The latter scenario is certainly not unheard of in the corporate
world. In many situations in which corporate counsel is aware of im-
proper conduct by other corporate officials, the reason counsel is
aware is that counsel already has become enmeshed with or entangled
in-if not an active participant in-the actions or decisions that the
lawyer subsequently has come to realize are law violations and that
thus impose on the lawyer a duty of rectification or, at minimum,
withdrawal from the representation. 60 In short, the lawyer, by virtue
of acting as a lawyer for the entity in matters involving wrongful con-
duct by officers of the entity, has been sucked into the course of im-
proper conduct.
This suggests a further problem that may well have confronted
Vince Foster. Not only might Foster have had information concerning
questionable and possibly unlawful conduct by White House officials
in connection with the Travel Office matter, but it also appears that
57. See, eg., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712 (D.D.C.
1978); In re American Continental CorpJLincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp.
1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992). See generally Hazard et al., supra note 46, at 75-127, 294-
323, 776-96.
58 See generally supra notes 47, 57 (and sources cited therein surveying relevant
Model Code provisions).
59. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 47, § 1.13, at 410 ("If, for example, a lawyer
became convinced that the entire hierarchy of an organization was engaged in a seri-
ous and ongoing fraud, the lawyer would be required to withdraw from the represen-
tation under Rule 1.16, and might in addition be permitted to reveal the reasons for
withdrawal to successor counsel or to the victims."); see, eg., Paulsen, Hell, Handbas-
kets, and Government Lawyers, supra note 44, at 98 & n.32 (criticizing conduct of At-
torney General Janet Reno on this ground).
60. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 47, § 1.13.
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Foster, in his role as Deputy White House Counsel, might have been
an active or passive participant in the firing of the Travel Office em-
ployees and in the White House's entreaties to the FBI to launch a
criminal investigation of the employees, in order to provide cover for
possibly improper political patronage.61 Foster may also have known
of efforts by some White House officials (possibly including the First
Lady62) to lie to or mislead federal investigators concerning their roles
in the firings. If so, Foster's silence may have constituted complicity
in ongoing wrongdoing.
Foster's actions doubtless were those traditionally associated with
an in-house attorney: preparing documents; providing advice; re-
searching issues of law; acting as an intermediary. There is nothing
unlawful in such acts, in and of themselves. But if Foster became
aware that the underlying actions of the officials involved were unlaw-
ful, such ordinary lawyering, done in furtherance of known unlawful
activity, may have constituted substantial assistance to the unlawful
conduct and subjected Foster to potential ethical, civil, and even
criminal liability.63
Foster, a good lawyer, probably knew all of this as well. The torn-
up note found in the bottom of Foster's briefcase shortly after his
death indicates not only his distressed emotional state, but also, con-
nected with that distress, his consciousness of his own mistakes as a
lawyer and the possibility that his conduct, and that of others, in con-
nection with the Travel Office matter could well have violated ethical
or legal standards. At the very least, Foster was acutely aware that he
and others might be accused of unethical or illegal conduct in connec-
tion with the Travel Office firings. 64
61. See supra notes 20-22 (detailing Foster's possible knowledge of alleged im-
proper conduct).
62. See Glenn R. Simpson, Ex-Aide Contradicts Stance of First Lady on Firings;
Notes, Testimony Depict Her as Central Player in Travel-Staff Removals, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 18, 1996, at A16 (detailing contradictions between Hillary Clinton's account of
events and that of aides, reflected in contemporaneous documents); supra notes 21,
22.
63. See Hazard et al., supra note 46, at 99-125,300-13.
64. One can hear, in Foster's pained personal musings, self-doubt mixed with at-
tempted self-justification:
I made mistakes from ignorance, inexperience, and overwork I did not
knowingly violate any law or standard of conduct. No one in the White
House, to my knowledge, violated any law or standard of conduct, including
any action in the Travel Office. There was no intent to benefit any individ-
ual or specific group. The FBI lied in their report to the AG.... The public
will never believe the innocence of the Clintons and their loyal staff. The
WSJ [Wall Street Journal] editors lie without consequence. I was not meant
for the job or the spotlight of public life in Washington. Here ruining people
is considered sport.
Reflections by Vincent Foster on Law and His Life, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at 31
(setting forth full text of the torn note and also of Foster's May 8, 1993 commence-
ment address at University of Arkansas Law School).
This note offers a window into Foster's probable legal and emotional thought proc-
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It was in the context of these events that Foster sought legal advice
from Hamilton. Almost certainly, Foster was seeking legal advice
concerning his own personal legal duties and potential liability. And
almost certainly, Foster intended and expected that his communica-
tions to Hamilton would be protected by the attorney-client privilege
and held by Hamilton in the strictest professional confidence. Ac-
cording to Hamilton's representation in the Swidler & Berlin litiga-
tion, the first word at the top of the first page of his notes is "Privi-
leged."65
We may never know for sure, but the substance of Foster's conver-
sation with Hamilton very likely was along the lines of the following.
Foster explained the facts of the Travel Office situation and of his in-
volvement in the firings and in recruiting the FBI to launch a criminal
investigation of the Travel Office employees. Foster explained what
he knew of conduct by other White House officials. Hamilton then
likely confirmed what Foster already knew: Foster's professional re-
sponsibility obligations as an attorney probably would not permit him
to refuse to disclose to the Attorney General, or other appointed in-
vestigator within the executive branch, his knowledge of events. Fos-
ter's duty as an attorney ran to the United States government, not to
the Clintons personally or any other officer within the Clinton admini-
stration. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), the mandatory reporting stat-
ute, constituted a specific reporting obligation-an affirmative duty
that Foster could not ignore.' For Foster not to report, because of his
own involvement in events, would be to become further involved in
the misconduct (if any). In any event, communications made to Fos-
ter by Watkins, by Hillary Rodham Clinton, or by others, even if in-
tended by the person making them to remain confidential communica-
tions to "their" attorney, the Deputy White House Counsel, would
most likely not be covered by the attorney-client privilege as against
the United States government (a point confirmed, years later, by two
ess concerning Travelgate. It is part confession, part legal brief. His mistakes were
from "ignorance" and "inexperience." He did not "lnowingly" violate any law or
standard-a classic technical defense of lack of knowledge-nor did anyone at the
White House "to my knowledge" commit such violation. There was "no intent" to
benefit anyone else by firing the Travel Office employees. Yet, "the public will never
believe" the innocence of the Clintons "and their loyal staff" (including, perhaps,
Watkins, Kennedy, and Foster himself).
65. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1998) ("During a
2-hour meeting, Hamilton took three pages of handwritten notes. One of the first en-
tries in the notes is the word 'Privileged."'); see also United States Supreme Court Of-
ficial Transcript at 3, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192) (oral argument of Mr. Hamilton)
("On Sunday, July 11, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. in the morning, Vince Foster came to my
home to consult me as a lawyer in the Travel Office matter, which was then the mat-
ter of intense public controversy. We spoke alone for 2 hours, during which time I
took three pages of notes .... Before we began, Mr. Foster asked me if the conversa-
tion was privileged and, without hesitation, I said that it was.").
66. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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extremely important U.S. Court of Appeals cases presenting exactly
this issue).67 Such conversations quite possibly would not be privi-
leged as against Congress, either.' The Fifth Amendment provides
no privilege against compelled testimony incriminating third parties
(as long as the witness is not forced to incriminate himself in the proc-
67. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998) (rejecting claim of attorney-client privilege as against grand jury subpoena of
communications from President Clinton to Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922-23 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied sub nom. 521 U.S. 1005 (1997) (rejecting claim of attorney-client
privilege as against grand jury of communications by Hillary Rodham Clinton to law-
yers in the White House Counsel's office, and notes of such conversations). For a de-
tailed analysis of the legal issues presented by these cases, see Paulsen, Who "Owns"
the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, supra note 44.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in the Lindsey case, together with its rejection of a
claim of Secret Service "protective function privilege," In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d
1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir.) 1079 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
stay denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of the Independent Counsel,
No. A-108, 1998 WL 438524, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461
(1998), opened the door to grand jury testimony by White House officials, including
attorneys and Secret Service agents, which in turn likely played a role in persuading
Monica Lewinsky to agree to provide testimonial and physical evidence under a grant
of immunity (lest she otherwise face criminal prosecution for perjury and obstruction
of justice). These events effectively forced President Clinton to admit (in part) con-
duct he had denied repeatedly and publicly for seven months and that he had denied
in sworn proceedings in a federal district court in the Jones v. Clinton civil sexual har-
assment case. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999). The rejection of these claims of
privilege, along with the development of other evidence against President Clinton in
the summer of 1998 (including evidence provided by Monica Lewinsky), unques-
tionably had a large effect on subsequent events and in leading to the initiation of im-
peachment proceedings against President Clinton.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in the In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum case
is significant because it specifically rejects the claim of an identity of interest between
the United States, as a distinct legal entity, and its officers or employees, such as Mrs.
Clinton, and further, because it specifically rejects the claim that Mrs. Clinton's per-
ception or belief that her communications to attorneys in the White House Counsel's
office would be privileged rendered them privileged, as against the officer represent-
ing the legal interests of the United States in the matter (i.e., the Independent Coun-
sel). See 112 F.3d at 922-23.
[T]here is lacking in this situation the requisite common interest between
the clients, who are Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity and the White
House. Mrs. Clinton's interest in the OIC's investigation is, naturally,
avoiding prosecution, or else minimizing the consequences if the OIC de-
cides to pursue charges against her. One searches in vain for any interest of
the White House which corresponds to Mrs. Clinton's personal interest....
[T]he White House and Mrs. Clinton have failed to establish that the inter-
ests of the Republic coincide with her personal interests ....
We next confront the conclusion of the District Court that Mrs. Clinton's
reasonable belief that her conversations with White House lawyers were
privileged is sufficient to prevent their disclosure....
[We know of no authority, and Mrs. Clinton has cited none, holding that
a client's beliefs.., about the law of privilege can transform an otherwise
unprivileged conversation into a privileged one.
Id. at 922-23.
68. See Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, supra
note 44, at 490 & n.52.
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ess). 69 Moreover, any personal Fifth Amendment privilege that Foster
might possess could be overcome by a grant of immunity.0 At most,
the Fifth Amendment could provide a justification for Foster's failure
to immediately report to the Attorney General possible criminal ac-
tivity of which he had knowledge (if such knowledge derived from his
own involvement). At a minimum, however, compliance with his
ethical duties would have required that Foster extricate himself from
the situation by resigning-and even this probably would not have
been sufficient, in the absence of reporting what he knew to the At-
torney General or her designee, or other designated investigator.
Vince Foster was caught on the horns of a dilemma. Foster was
personally loyal to the Clintons. He believed in their innocence and
that of their "loyal staff."'" But Foster also understood that this per-
sonal loyalty did not authorize or permit him to violate his legal and
ethical duties as an attorney and as a government employee. Foster
could not betray the Clintons. Nor could he ignore his legal obliga-
tions and become (either for the first time, or more deeply) involved
personally in potentially unlawful conduct and attempts to cover it up.
Nor could he accept without considerable personal distress that his
own conduct may have been unethical or illegal-or that others would
perceive it as such.' Foster's conversation with Hamilton probably
confirmed the existence of this enormous personal ethical and legal
dilemma-in addition, no doubt, to setting forth at least some impor-
tant factual information concerning the Travel Office (and perhaps
other matters) that formed the basis for his dilemma.
Foster committed suicide on July 20, 1993, while the Travel Office
controversy was still swirling about him,73 and just nine days after his
meeting with James Hamilton. It would be going too far to assert
unequivocally that Vince Foster killed himself to escape his ethical
and personal dilemma. Yet there is a strong factual basis for believing
both that such a dilemma existed and that it troubled Foster deeply-
deeply enough to fuel his growing depression and deeply enough to
lead him to seek legal counsel. It is generally agreed that the Travel
Office affair, coming on top of everything else, was a significant con-
tributing factor to Foster's distressed emotional state74 and that his
depression led to his suicide.7 As the Supreme Court noted, Foster
69. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976) (citing Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906)).
70. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment is satisfied by granting use immunity); see also United States v. North,
920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
71. See supra note 64 (quoting text of tom-up note).
72. See supra notes 23-24 (describing Foster's probable state of mind).
73. See supra note 32 (noting proximity of suicide to press calls for Independent
Counsel investigation of Travelgate).
74. See IC Report, supra note 1, at 106.
75. See id. at 113-14.
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may already have been contemplating suicide when he went to see
Hamilton.76 If his conversation with Hamilton led Foster to conclude
that there was no good way out of his ethical and personal quandary-
no way for him to act both faithfully to the law and faithfully to his
friends-that could have deepened his depression and suicidality. As
Dr. Berman reported to the Independent Counsel:
[F]or certain executives facing difficult circumstances, "[i]n essence,
death is preferred to preserve one's identity. The suicide has an in-
ability to tolerate an altered view of himself; suicide maintains a self-
view and escapes having to incorporate discordant implications
about the self. These types of suicides are typically complete sur-
prises to others in the available support system."
77
Combined with everything else that was going on in Foster's life-
the stress and public pressure of work, the press criticism, the damage
to his public reputation (which, Dr. Berman's report would later con-
clude, was fundamental to Foster's sense of personal identity)-it is
possible that Foster's dilemma proved to be one he could not live
with. If so, the Foster tragedy is in part a tragedy of legal ethics.
II. SWIDLER & BERLIN: THE POST-MORTEM PRIVILEGE
Compared with the high drama of Foster's wrenching personal and
ethical dilemma, and with the tragedy of Foster's suicide, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Swidler & Berlin v. United States is almost anticli-
mactic. None of this background-Foster's dilemma, his possible
knowledge of illegality (and his possible involvement in it), his state-
of-mind at the time of his suicide, the likely subjects of his conversa-
tion with Hamilton-is anywhere to be found in the Court's opinion.
The only hint of any of this is the Court's understated speculation, in
passing, that Foster may have been suicidal at the time he sought legal
advice.79
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court presents a dispas-
sionate and, on the whole, fairly persuasive case for the proposition
76. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,408 (1998).
77. Berman Report at 14, cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 101.
78. Berman Report at 14, cited in IC Report, supra note 1, at 99. Dr. Berman re-
ported that:
[m]istakes, real or perceived, posed a profound threat to his self-esteem/self-
worth and represented evidence for a lack of control over his environment.
Feelings of unworthiness, inferiority, and guilt followed and were difficult
for him to tolerate. There are signs of an intense and profound anguish,
harsh self-evaluation, shame, and chronic fear. All these on top of an evi-
dent clinical depression and his separation from the comforts and security of
Little Rock. He, furthermore, faced a feared humiliation should he resign
and return to Little Rock. [The torn note] highlights his preoccupation with
themes of guilt, anger, and his need to protect others.
Id.
79. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408.
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that the attorney-client privilege should survive the death of the client
even where information is sought from the attorney that may be very
important to a criminal proceeding.80 The opinion first recites the
standard policy arguments offered for the attorney-client privilege:
the privilege encourages full and frank communications to attorneys,
enabling them to give clients legal advice that promotes public inter-
ests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.8' The
80. See id. at 403-11.
81. See id. at 403 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981));
see also Erick S. Ottoson, Comment, Dead Man Talking: A New Approach to the
Post-Mortem Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1329, 1333 (1998) ("The set-
tled rationale behind the attorney-client privilege is that it promotes honest and com-
plete disclosure by clients and thereby serves the public's interest in competent legal
representation."). See generally id. at 1333-36 (collecting and discussing authorities).
The honest-and-complete-disclosure rationale for the privilege is certainly subject
to serious question, however, on both empirical and practical grounds. First, it is un-
clear the extent to which clients actually rely on the privilege in being truthful and
forthcoming with their attorneys. Second, it is unclear whether, even with the privi-
lege, clients are truthful and forthcoming with their attorneys. Third, the privilege
itself is afflicted with many uncertainties and ambiguities, so that a lawyer, even after
reciting the standard exceptions to the privilege, cannot truly assure a client, up front,
that any particular communication will remain privileged. (Hamilton's blanket assur-
ance to Foster that his statements would be "privileged," Oral Argument Transcript
at 3, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192), was simply not accurate unless functionally
serving as shorthand for an assumed shared understanding that they would be cov-
ered by Hamilton's duty of conftdentiality and that Hamilton would invoke privilege
against any attempt to compel disclosure of such statements.)
Finally, even to the extent the privilege is thought clear and clients in fact rely on it,
it is unclear whether attorneys in fact invariably encourage honest and complete dis-
closure by their clients. Because ethics rules impose obligations on attorneys not to
offer known false evidence or testimony, see Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 3.3(a) (1998) (lawyer must not make false statements of law or fact to tribunal,
fail to disclose material facts where disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client's
criminal or fraudulent act, offer evidence the lawyer knows to be false or fail to rem-
edy, upon discovery, the inadvertent introduction of false material evidence), some
lawyers (reportedly) seek to avoid "actual knowledge" of facts that might impair their
ability to present a claim or defense and, to that end, discourage honest and complete
disclosure from their clients. This practice is ethically dubious (to say the least) but
reputedly common among criminal defense lawyers (or at least so some of them say).
See, eg., Stephen Gillers, A Fool For a Client? Am. Law., Oct. 1998, at 74-75. It
would appear that such a practice is improper in civil litigation, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 (which requires a good faith inquiry by the attorney into the fac-
tual basis for a claim or defense-an obligation that would seem to require an attor-
ney to press his or her client for full and candid information), but such a proposition is
not clearly settled and the practical weakening of Rule 11's substantive and enforce-
ment standards in recent years may weaken the force of this claim. See 146 F.R.D.
507 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even if the practice is improper, that does not
mean that lawyers never engage in it, at least some of the time. In any event, a lawyer
and client may not know at the time legal representation is commenced whether the
matter in question has criminal, rather than merely civil, implications, and some law-
yers may therefore discourage complete candor from their clients at least at the out-
set.
To all of these points, there is a flipside: Some clients might be completely candid
with their attorneys, irrespective of the existence of any privilege, either for reasons of
psychological or emotional need, out of self-interested concern that such disclosure is
1999]
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opinion then notes that interpretation of the scope of the privilege is
governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501's instruction to look to
"the principles of the common law ... as interpreted by the courts...
in the light of reason and experience. '  The Court canvassed the
relatively few precedents for the survival of the attorney-client privi-
lege after the death of the client, noting both the well-recognized tes-
tamentary exception83 and the premise (if not the actual holding) of
most cases that the privilege otherwise survives."4 The Court con-
cluded that "[t]he great body of this case law supports, either by
holding or considered dicta, the position that the privilege does sur-
vive in a case such as the present one."8 5 The burden thus rested with
the Independent Counsel, the Court concluded, to show that "reason
and experience" justified a departure from the presumption of a post-
humous privilege.86
In the Court's view, the Independent Counsel failed to make "a suf-
ficient showing to overturn the common law rule embodied in the
prevailing caselaw." The Court first rejected the Independent Coun-
sel's argument that the testamentary exception effectively swallowed
the supposed posthumous privilege rule since the testamentary excep-
tion covered the vast majority of cases in which the posthumous
privilege was at issue.' The Court reasoned that, in such cases, unlike
cases involving compelled grand jury testimony by the deceased's at-
torney, disclosure of the communication "furthers the client's in-
tent."89
The Court also rejected the argument that there should be no post-
humous privilege because "the attorney is being required to disclose
only what the client could have been required to disclose" as being "at
odds with the basis for the privilege even during the client's life-
time.... [T]he loss of evidence admittedly caused by the privilege is
justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may
not have made such communications in the first place." 9 This, the
Court concluded "is true of disclosure before and after the client's
death. Without assurance of the privilege's posthumous application,
necessary in order to enable the lawyer to provide the best representation possible
(outweighing any concern over disclosure), or simply out of honesty.
Regrettably, there is very little empirical research on any of these points, as the Su-
preme Court noted in Swidler & Berlin. See 524 U.S. at 409 n.4.
82. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 501).
83. The testamentary exception provides that communications of a deceased cli-
ent to his attorney may be revealed in order to show true testamentary intent in a
contested proceeding over the meaning of a will or trust. See id. at 404-05.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 405.
86. Id. at 406.
87. Id. at 411.
88. See id. 406.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 408.
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the client may very well not have made disclosures to his attorney at
all, so the loss of evidence is more apparent than real."91 The Court
used Foster's situation to illustrate the point: "[I]t seems quite plausi-
ble that Foster, perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have
sought legal advice from Hamilton if he had not been assured the
conversation was privileged."' 9
This is an interesting sentence, to which I will return presently, for it
raises intriguing questions concerning whether the result in the case
should be different if Foster expressed suicidal intentions to Hamilton
or inquired whether the privilege would survive -his death-matters
bearing on whether Foster's suicide was in part intended to destroy
evidence, and whether any legal advice Hamilton may have given con-
cerning the permanency of the privilege, combined with advice about
the inescapability of Foster's dilemma, might have contributed to Fos-
ter's decision to take his own life. These questions are especially in-
triguing in light of the Court's rejection, in the next paragraph of its
opinion, of the Independent Counsel's argument (which had been
adopted by the Court of Appeals in the opinion below") that the
privilege should yield where the testimony or evidence sought is of
substantial importance to a criminal proceeding or investigation.?
Petitioner James Hamilton had conceded in oral argument before
the Supreme Court that breach of the privilege might be warranted
where necessary to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights, as when, for example, the deceased had confessed to his attor-
ney a crime for which another person stood wrongfully accused.95 Jus-
tice O'Connor's dissent (for herself and Justices Scalia and Thomas)
made much of this concession-arguing that it justified a more general
exception to the posthumous privilege: "In my view," O'Connor
wrote, "a criminal defendant's right to exculpatory evidence or a
compelling law enforcement need for information may, where the tes-
timony is not available from other sources, override a client's posthu-
mous interest in confidentiality." 96 Justice O'Connor's dissent, like the
91. Id
92. Id. (emphasis added). Of course, Hamilton could not have offered such assur-
ance with any degree of certainty. The issue resolved by the Court in Swidler & Ber-
lin could not fairly be said to have been settled prior to the Court's decision itself. See
also infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
93. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230,235 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
94. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408-09.
95. See id. at 408 n.3.
96. Id at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dominant view of
most academic commentators has also been that the posthumous privilege should
yield for compelling reasons. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 127 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (suggesting situations in
which an exception to the privilege might be warranted); McCormick on Evidence §
94 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (stating that the privilege is nullified in certain
cases after the death of the client where the attorney's testimony would be more reli-
able and would promote the client's interests); Wolfram, supra note 47, § 6.3, at 256
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opinion of the Court of Appeals, emphasized that the attorney-client
privilege does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts communi-
cated by the client to the attorney, and that, "were the client living,
prosecutors could grant immunity and compel the relevant testi-
mony."' 9
The Supreme Court majority, however, rejected any substantial-
importance-to-criminal-proceeding exception as introducing "ex post
balancing" that would introduce "substantial uncertainty into the
privilege's application,""8 uncertainty that would be at odds with the
privilege's ostensible purpose of promoting full and frank discussions
between clients and lawyers. The Court explained that "a client may
not know at the time he discloses information to his attorney whether
it will later be relevant to a civil or criminal matter, let alone whether
it will be of substantial importance." 99
The Court's analysis disguises a large set of implicit assumptions
about the certainty of application of the attorney-client privilege apart
from the specific issue of posthumous privilege. A client, for example,
might not know a lot of things about application of the privilege in
some as-yet-uncommenced (or even commenced) legal proceeding,
and his lawyer might not be able to tell him with any degree of objec-
tive certainty. Not only might a client not know in advance whether,
after his death, his communications to an attorney might be relevant
to a criminal rather than a civil proceeding, but the client might also
not know in advance-and likely would care a great deal more-
whether his communications will be privileged at all, even during his
lifetime: What is the exact scope of the crime-fraud exception? What
if the client engages in legally questionable conduct, against his
lawyer's advice, that attempts to skirt illegality by making use of the
lawyer's advice? What if the client tells his lawyer one thing, then
(stating that the privilege does not apply to testimony by a will-drafting lawyer after a
client's death when the lawyer's testimony concerns the execution of the will); 24
Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure §
5498, at 483-86 (1986) (determining that most of the major figures in evidence schol-
arship favored ending the privilege with the death of the client); Christopher B.
Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick Evidence, § 526, at 430-31 (stating that the attorney-
client privilege surviving the death of a client has been sharply criticized and suggest-
ing that the privilege should be qualified); cf. Ottoson, supra note 81, at 1353-56 (ar-
guing for a "probable conspiracy" involving the deceased exception to posthumous
privilege). But see Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of
the Client, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 45, 55-79 (1992) (arguing that the current rule that
the attorney-client privilege will generally survive the client's death should continue
as this policy would further promote the interests the privilege seeks to protect); Har-
vard Law Review, The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 122, 222-32
1998) (endorsing Supreme Court's analysis in Swidler & Berlin).
97. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 412 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also In re
Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234 ("[The client's] availability has been conventionally in-
voked as an explanation of why the privilege only slightly impairs access to the
truth.").
98. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409.
99. Id.
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advice? What if the client tells his lawyer one thing, then wishes to
change his story for a deposition or other testimony? Apart from
questions of privilege (against compelled disclosure by legal process),
will the lawyer be permitted to disclose certain communications, in
certain circumstances, and will this particular lawyer do so or not?
And if the law of privilege is judge-made "common law," what assur-
ance exists that new exceptions will not be created, especially where
application of the privilege to a given set of circumstances is not well
settled by controlling precedent (certainly the case in Swidler & Berlin
itself)? For that matter, cannot the common law of privilege simply
be changed by the courts, overruling previous precedents that a ma-
jority of the court no longer finds persuasive, or finds unpersuasive on
a particular set of facts?
If the rationale for the privilege--encouraging client candor to at-
torneys so attorneys can give sound legal advice, serving public ends
in promoting justice'--depends on a high degree of up-front cer-
tainty on the part of clients as to whether a given communication wil
remain confidential, then the rationale for the privilege is already un-
dermined by the significant number of other factors that defeat cer-
tainty. As noted earlier, there are many reasons why clients might not
be fully candid with their attorneys, including uncertainty as to scope
of the privilege, lack of knowledge, and perhaps even their attorneys'
instructions not to be too forthcoming so as not to hamper the presen-
tation of a factually false defense.10 1
Good empirical work does not exist to answer the question of how
uncertainties concerning privilege and confidentiality affect clients'
willingness to disclose damaging or embarrassing information to their
lawyers."tn Of course, the fact that uncertainty already exists does not
justify creation of a rule that would increase uncertainty. It seems ob-
vious, however, that almost all of the uncertainties set forth in the
previous paragraphs would be of far more relevance to a client con-
templating the degree to which he safely can be forthcoming to his
lawyer, than would be the question of whether attorney-client privi-
lege will survive the client's death in the event the communications
become relevant to a criminal investigation-unless, that is, the client
is near death, in fear of his life, or "perhaps already contemplating
suicide"1 3 and believes that the topics of his communications to his
100. See id. at 410; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981).
101. See supra note 81 (suggesting that clients often are not willing to rely on the
privilege to disclose all information to their attorneys, and even where they are willing
the attorney sometimes might discourage such disclosure). If attorneys discourage
candor for such a reason, this seriously undercuts the traditional rationale for the
privilege insofar as that traditional rationale posits the attorney's need for full infor-
mation in order to provide legal advice that promotes the public ends of justice. See
Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
102. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 n.4.
103. Id. at 408.
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lawyer are in fact likely to become (or already are) the subject of a
criminal investigation.
That brings us back to the unique facts of the Vince Foster case.
The Court's premise was that a client may not know in advance
whether the information he confides to his attorney will later be rele-
vant to a criminal matter, and that this uncertainty might lead him to
hold back. But what if the client does know that the information is
likely to be highly relevant to an expected criminal investigation (as
was very probably the case with Foster)? What if the client is, moreo-
ver, contemplating suicide (as the Court itself speculated might have
been the case with Foster)? And what if the client's contemplation of
suicide is in part related to the criminal investigation itself and the cli-
ent's knowledge of the facts (and involvement in the events them-
selves)?
These are the salient questions in Vince Foster's case, but the Court
ignored them, even as it noted the relevance of such factors to a cli-
ent's expectations concerning confidentiality. This renders the
Court's analysis vulnerable on two counts: First, if uncertainty as to
posthumous application of the privilege were a strong barrier to a cli-
ent's willingness to communicate confidences to his lawyer, it should
have been so with Vince Foster. There is unintended irony in the
Court's suggestion that Foster, if already contemplating suicide, might
not have confided in Hamilton "if had he not been assured that the
conversation was privileged."1 "4 Given the state of the law prior to the
Court's decision, Hamilton could not have given any such assurance,
at least not with respect to survival of the privilege after the death of the
client. The law of posthumous privilege at the time was uncertain, at
best. Case law assumed survival of the privilege, but mostly in dicta in
cases where the privilege in fact was pierced for reasons of ascertain-
ing testamentary intent.105 Treatises and law review articles were gen-
erally critical of the survival premise."° No prominent federal court
decision existed on point, let alone any controlling Supreme Court de-
cision. Few state courts of last resort had ruled on the point. (And
one cannot be certain in advance whether state or federal privilege
law will govern a given communication.'0) Moreover, few lawyers are
sufficiently conversant in the details of attorney-client privilege to
know all of this at the drop of a hat; probably fewer yet would imme-
diately explain all this at the threshold of a client's initial consultation,
even if they knew. It thus seems highly unlikely that Hamilton's as-
104. Id.
105. See id. at 404-05.
106. See, e.g., id. at 406-07 (collecting authorities critical of survival of the privilege
after death of the client); see also supra note 96 (collecting authorities).
107. Cf. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) ("[Any State's promise of confi-
dentiality would have little value if the patient were aware that the [psychotherapist-
patient] privilege would not be honored in a federal court.").
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surances to Foster about the privileged status of their conversation in-
cluded, at the outset, assurance that the privilege would apply post-
humously. (Hamilton told the Supreme Court that he had assured
Foster that their conversation was "privileged." But he did not, of
course, tell the Court that he had advised Foster that their conversa-
tion would remain privileged were Foster to commit suicide.")
Despite all this, Foster (apparently) confided important informa-
tion to Hamilton. Foster may indeed have desired and intended that
his statements would remain privileged, but he could not have had any
degree of certainty about the posthumous privilege, unless he relied
without reservation on Hamilton's blanket assurance (which was at
least overbroad, and arguably reckless, given the state of the law of
privilege at the time). Thus, the example of Foster himself is at odds
with the Court's analysis: uncertainty about posthumous application
of the privilege does not invariably chill clients-even very sophisti-
cated ones, and even potentially suicidal ones-from confiding in their
attorneys.
The second problem with the Court's analysis is that, were it known
to the client, up front, that the privilege would not apply posthu-
mously in a criminal proceeding-that is, if the rule proposed by the
dissent and by the D.C. Circuit were adopted-the application of the
privilege would in fact be predictable; clients could take the rule into
account in considering their own prospective conduct. Clients would
know (or could be told) that the privilege would exist during the cli-
ent's lifetime, but would yield after the client's death where a compel-
ling law enforcement need for the underlying facts is shown. (The
same would hold true of any narrower exception to the privilege after
death as well, so long as the exception is clear.) To be sure, this might
deter certain attorney-client communications, but only where the client
had reason to believe or expect that his death would prevent his own
testimony--exactly the situation that, if the Court was right in its
speculation about Foster's state of mind, should have deterred Foster
from disclosing confidences to Hamilton.
Interestingly, if it is true that Foster was "perhaps already contem-
plating suicide" when he went to see Hamilton, then a substantial-
need-for-criminal-proceeding exception to the posthumous privilege
(or a narrower exception, such as the suicide-to-destroy-evidence ex-
ception I propose presently), if explained to Foster, would make clear
that suicide would not solve Foster's dilemma. The opposite rule-
that is, the rule the Court announced in Swidler & Berlin-could have
the perverse effect of encouraging a client's suicide by assuring that
conversations with one's attorney will always remain sealed. By de-
clining to recognize an exception to the posthumous attorney-client
privilege under the circumstances of the case, the rule of Swidler &
108. See supra note 65.
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Berlin, if known to the client in advance, tells a client in a situation
analogous to Vince Foster's that suicide is the way out of his legal and
ethical quandary. By killing himself, he silences a witness, avoids
having to testify, and avoids having to come forward. And his lawyer
cannot be compelled to reveal anything the client told the lawyer.
On the other hand, knowledge of such an exception to the posthu-
mous privilege might discourage the already-suicidal material witness
(or co-conspirator) from seeking legal advice in the first place, and we
do not wish to deter persons in desperate emotional states resulting
from legal difficulties from seeking legal advice, just as we do not wish
to deter persons from seeking help from psychiatrists, psychologists,
or other mental health professionals.1" This, however, begins to as-
sume a level of detailed knowledge of attorney-client privilege law
that is not typical of the average client and probably not discussed ex
ante in a typical attorney-client relationship. (Moreover, as noted,
even though Vince Foster was not an average client and doubtless had
a far better understanding of attorney-client privilege than most, he
still was not deterred from seeking legal advice under such circum-
stances.)
All of this speculation depends heavily on hunches and assumptions
about what rule is most likely to affect the conduct of a person con-
templating suicide in a situation where suicidality is connected in
some way to the person's knowledge as a witness, potential witness, or
subject of a criminal legal proceeding. The answer to all of this, as an
empirical matter, is probably unknowable. But it is reasonable to
speculate as to the consequences of different rules in structuring dis-
cussions between a client and an attorney. Imagine, for example, a
possible conversation between Foster and Hamilton where Foster
specifically asked the legal question presented by Swidler & Berlin.
"Will the privilege survive my death?" (What if Foster asked a yet
more specific question: "Will the privilege survive my suicide?" What
if that question came in the midst of a conversation discussing Foster's
legal obligations and liabilities in connection with his knowledge
about the Travel Office situation-such that maintenance of silence
after death and the legal ethics dilemma confronting Foster were
linked in the same conversation?) Imagine a hypothetical conversa-
tion along the following lines. (Think about the problem first, as it
would have been presented in July 1993, and then as it would have
been presented in July 1998, the month after the Supreme Court's de-
cision.)
Foster: So what you're saying is that I'm probably professionally
and legally obligated to report what I know to the Attorney Gen-
eral?
109. See generally Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11 (explaining the reasons behind certain
recognized privileges, such as psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client).
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Hamilton: That seems pretty much right.
Foster: And it's not attorney-client privileged, because neither Hil-
lary nor any other White House official is my client.
Hamilton: That's right.
Foster: And it's only protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination to the extent I'm likely to be incriminated by it.
Hamilton: Right. If subpoenaed, the Fifth Amendment doesn't
permit you to refuse to disclose what you may know about another
person's wrongful acts, as long as that doesn't tend to incriminate
you. In any event, a grand jury or a congressional investigation
could grant you immunity and compel you to testify, irrespective of
any Fifth Amendment privilege.
Foster: It looks like there's no sure way that I can avoid telling what
I know.
Hamilton: In fact, it looks like you are legally and ethically obli-
gated to come forward with what you know.
Foster: [After a long pause] Just speaking theoretically, if I were
dead, they obviously can't compel my testimony. And our conversa-
tion today would still be privileged, right? I'm just coming to you, in
confidence, for legal advice. Your duty of confidentiality, and the
attorney-client privilege, survive the death of the client, don't they?
Hamilton: That's my understanding. But Vince, you shouldn't be
even thinking along those lines.
Foster: No, no, of course not. But I do want to be clear that I want
this to be kept totally confidential, no matter what. Right?
Hamilton: I understand completely.
Is such a conversation far-fetched? Not necessarily. It is not un-
common for suicidal persons to discuss with others, in advance of their
suicide, its moral, financial, practical, and even religious implica-
tions."10 It is certainly not outlandish to think that a lavyer might in-
110. One of my first cases as a private attorney involved a wrongful death action
brought against a protestant Christian church for "negligent spiritual counseling" of a
twenty-four year old seminary student (who was considering law school) who later
committed suicide. One of the main theories of liability was that the victim had asked
a church pastor whether he would lose his eternal salvation if he committed suicide.
The pastor told the victim that the church's theology was that a person who was once
saved was always saved, and could not lose salvation by subsequent sins just as he
could not gain salvation by good works. (This teaching apparently contradicted that
of the victim's Roman Catholic upbringing, which taught that certain mortal sins, in-
cluding suicide, resulted in eternal damnation.) The pastor added that the victim
should not be thinking along such lines, however. The California Supreme Court
found for the church. See Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal.
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quire as to suicide's legal implications, concerning the subjects about
which he (and others) faced potential legal liability and about which
he had come to another attorney for advice.
It would of course be improper for a lawyer affirmatively to advise
suicide as a course of action. "I But it would not be improper for the
lawyer to tell the client what Swidler & Berlin holds.12  And what
Swidler & Berlin holds is that a client's suicide permanently silences
the lawyer as to all otherwise privileged communications between the
client and the lawyer. Swidler & Berlin never addresses these possi-
bilities or their implications. Neither the majority opinion, nor the
dissent, nor the Court of Appeals, nor the briefs of the parties, con-
sider whether the privilege should survive the death of the client
where the client's suicide destroys access to valuable information, in
the form of the deceased's own testimony, that the government oth-
erwise would have been able to obtain in a criminal investigation-es-
pecially where that suicide may have been intended (in part) to de-
stroy such evidence. Suicide is, or often can be, a volitional act."'
1988).
111. It seems unlikely that such a conversation would be susceptible to discovery
under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, unless it can be
shown that the communications were made for the purpose of, or in furtherance of,
the client's intended criminal act. There of course may be limitations on the ability of
the attorney to advise the client to commit suicide, to the extent that suicide remains a
crime in some jurisdictions. Moreover, if the client comes to the lawyer seeking ad-
vice as to whether he may effectively destroy access to his own testimony (a crime) by
committing suicide (even if not a crime), the lawyer not only may not provide such
advice in apparent furtherance of the unlawful scheme, see Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) (1998), but the conversation becomes unprivileged under
the crime-fraud exception in the event the client attempts to carry out the plan, and
no longer covered by the attorney's professional duty of confidentiality under most
versions of the confidentiality rule. See id. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (providing exception to duty
of confidentiality permitting lawyer to reveal information "to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm.").
112. See id. Rule 1.2(d) ("...but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client.").
113. See generally James Werth, Rational Suicide: Implications for Mental Health
Professionals (1996) (arguing "that it is possible to make a rational decision to commit
suicide"). The legal literature concerning suicide has focused mainly on the problems
of physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the rights of the terminally ill to decline
medical assistance, issues that have given rise to two important Supreme Court deci-
sions. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (holding that the Due
Process Clause does not protect a right to assistance in committing suicide); Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1990) (holding that a state may re-
quire "clear and convincing" evidence of an incompetent's wishes to refuse life-saving
treatment). A detailed discussion of this literature would take me far afield from the
question of attorney-client privilege in the context of client suicide. To oversimplify
crudely, a consensus exists that there is at least a category of suicide in which the vic-
tim is competent to make the decision to take his or her own life, or to decline care
that could prevent his or her death, and that it is possible for medical officials (and
thus the law) to assess issues of voluntariness. For an excellent treatment, see J.
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While it has been decriminalized in many American jurisdictions
(chiefly for purposes of not stigmatizing the deceased), it is still a law
crime in some and is treated as a wrongful or strongly disfavored act
by the law in a great many.11 4 It is not at all clear why, especially
where the client was himself either involved in probable unlawful ac-
tivity or possessed (while alive) an affirmative legal obligation to dis-
close his knowledge of such unlawful activity, the attorney-client
privilege should not be deemed forfeited (much as is the case with the
crime-fraud exception to the privilege) as to underlying factual infor-
mation in the attorney's possession concerning the client's knowledge
of underlying events. A balancing of policy considerations, focused
on the special case of suicide and its consequent destruction of evi-
dence, should have weighed heavily against application of the privi-
lege, especially where the policy arguments in its favor appear so
speculative and (on the facts of this case at least) even counterfactual.
Nor did prior case law unquestionably establish that the privilege
should apply in this context. In light of the generally unsettled state of
the law on posthumous privilege at the time of the Supreme Court's
decision-and especially in light of the absence of any precedent di-
rectly addressing facts like those presented in Swvidler & Berlin-rec-
ognition of a Dead Man's Privilege for communications with counsel,
under the circumstances of Foster's suicide, should have been viewed
Werth et. al., Requests for Physician Assisted Death: Guidelines and Suggestions for
Assessing Mental Capacity, (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author), to be
published in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (forthcoming 1999). I do not pur-
port to enter this debate. I merely posit here (in accord with apparent current medi-
cal and psychological consensus) that some suicides are committed by persons who
are not so overcome by depression or other mental illness as to have lost the mental
capacity to understand their actions and to have chosen suicide voluntarily and com-
petently (if nonetheless tragically). The Vince Foster case seems to fall into that cate-
gory. See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text (discussing Foster's apparent men-
tal state). I address below whether some modification of the rule I propose is justified
in cases where the client's suicide is thought to be involuntary because the client
lacked the mental capacity to have made a competent, uncoerced choice of suicide at
the time of his or her death. See hifra note 131.
114. Blackstone described suicide as "Self Murder, the pretended heroism, but real
cowardice, of the stoic philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills
which they had not the fortitude to endure" and noted that "the law has... ranked
[suicide] among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony, a felony
committed on one's self."). 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 189 (8th ed. 1778). Many American jurisdictions continue to regard suicide
as a crime or otherwise as an act strongly against the public interest, for purposes of
adjudicating a wide variety of related issues. See, eg., Gentry v. State, 625 N.E.2d
1268, 1272-73 (Ind. App. 1993) (stating that both causing a suicide and assisting a sui-
cide are felonies in Indiana, even though committing suicide is not); State v. Willis,
121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961) (noting that attempted suicide is a crime); Clift v. Narra-
gansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 808 (RI. 1996) (noting that suicide is a felony
in Rhode Island); Wackawitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992) (noting that
"[s]uicide... remains a common law crime in Virginia as it does in a number of other
common-law states" and collecting authorities). See generally 40A Am. Jur. 2d §§ 619-
625 (1999).
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by the Court as a proposed extension of the common law, not as the
presumptive common law rule. The Court's conclusion that "[t]he
great body of this caselaw supports... the position that the privilege
does survive in a case such as [this] one"' simply disregards the dis-
tinctive facts that make this case "a case such as [this] one": voluntary
suicide, destroying access to testimony, and avoiding the deceased's
(probable) legal duty to come forward with information to investigat-
ing officials.
Client death is simply not the same as client suicide. Prior to
Swidler & Berlin, only one state court of last resort had ever found a
post-mortem attorney-client privilege where the client's suicide de-
stroyed access to testimony that was the only alternative source of the
information sought.n 6 At least one other state court has gone the
other way, in civil cases where suicide versus accidental death was
relevant to an issue in litigation and the deceased's communications to
an attorney were relevant to that issue.1 7 The remaining state and
federal cases were divided as to whether the privilege survives client
death generally, 118 or else addressed the point only in dicta.119 Espe-
cially in light of the oft-stated principle that privileges are in deroga-
tion of the search for truth and therefore should be construed nar-
rowly and not lightly created or expanded,12° the presumption should
115. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,405 (1998) (emphasis added).
116. See In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69,72 (Mass. 1990).
117. See Prink v. Rockefeller Ctr., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 517, 521 (N.Y. 1979) (finding
that deceased's communications to wife and to psychiatrist were not privileged in ac-
tion for negligence where deceased's voluntary suicide was asserted as defense to li-
ability and the deceased would not have been able to maintain the privilege had he
survived and brought the action); Martin v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 466
N.Y.S.2d 596, 597, 599 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (finding that deceased's communications to at-
torney were not privileged where deceased had apparently committed suicide and the
issue in civil suit was suicide-exclusion provision of life insurance policy). Martin re-
lies heavily on the reasoning of Prink and extends it to attorney-client communica-
tions. See Martin, 466 N.Y.S.2d. at 598-99.
118. Compare Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976) (privilege does not survive death), with State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 219
(S.C. 1981) (privilege survives death), and State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086
(Ariz. 1976) (privilege survives death).
Cohen, Doster, and Macumber are all cited in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Swidler & Berlin. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 404-05. Interestingly, however,
Doster and Macumber (the two cases, in addition to John Doe Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, that supported the Court's position), refuse to pierce the privilege even in the
face of a criminal defendant's claim that the information obtained thereby would be
material and exculpatory. The Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin noted Hamilton's
concession that protecting a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might warrant
breach of the privilege, and expressly declined to reach the issue. See id. at 408 n.3.
Nonetheless the Court relied in part on state cases that support the Court's conclusion
about the weight of common law precedent only if those state cases are correct in
their resolution of an issue the Supreme Court declined to reach.
119. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403-04 (collecting cases on the testamentary
exception).
120. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) ("[W]e start with the primary
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have been the opposite of the one the Court embraced in Swidler &
Berlin-against recognition of the post-mortem privilege on the facts
of this case.
What, then, moved the Court to its result? The Court may simply
have thought that the alternative rule advanced by the Independent
Counsel,' the dissent,m and the D.C. Circuit m was worse: a broad
exception for criminal cases upon satisfaction of an unfocused, after-
the-fact balancing test. The Court was evidently quite concerned (not
without some justification) that such an exception would create a
gaping hole in the post-death privilege and, by virtue of clients' in-
ability to anticipate its application, diminish the value of the privilege
generally.'m
The Court was right, I believe, in sensing the overbreadth of the
D.C. Circuit's exception.'2 But the Court was wrong in not seeing the
possibility of a narrower exception (though it did not receive much
help from the lower court or the Office of Independent Counsel in
this regard). I propose an alternative rule, that focuses more crisply
on the critical features of the Vince Foster case: (1) the client's vol-
untary act;, (2) of suicide; (3) causing the knowing and voluntary de-
struction of evidence that otherwise could have been obtained had the
client lived.
It is not the fact that the client is deceased, but the fact that the cli-
ent took his own life, that is important. It is the fact of suicide-the
client's volitional and arguably wrongful act, within his or her own
control-that is key. Moreover, it is not so much the fact that the
prosecutor's access to evidence is more difficult because the client is
deceased, but the fact that the client made it more difficult (and per-
haps even impossible) by the client's own intentional conduct, that is
important. It is these critical facts that support an exception to the
privilege, after the client's death, where the client voluntarily causes
his or her own death. An exception triggered only by the presence of
these factors would be an exception to the privilege within the client's
complete ability to anticipate and control by his or her own voluntary
future conduct.
I therefore propose the following formulation: The attorney-client
assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giv-
ing, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule." (original quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974) ("[Privileges] are not
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
truth.").
121. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403-04.
122. See it. at 412 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
124. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410.
125. The difficulties with the D.C. Circuit's approach are astutely analyzed in Otto-
son, supra note 81, at 1345-53.
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privilege should not extend, after the suicide of the client, to attorney-
client communications relevant to an extant or subsequent criminal in-
vestigation or [other legal26] proceeding, where the client's intentional
act of suicide destroys material testimony or evidence, unavailable by
other means after the suicide and the production of which could have
been compelled by process of law when the client was alive, upon a
prima facie showing of probable cause that the suicide was related to or
motivated in part by the subject(s) of the criminal investigation. Put
somewhat more colloquially, if the prosecutor can show good reason
to believe that an individual committed suicide in part with the known
and intended consequence of rendering his or her own material testi-
mony unavailable in a criminal investigation or other criminal pro-
ceeding, the individual forfeits the attorney-client privilege as to
communications related to the subject of the investigation or other
criminal proceeding.
This narrower rule has a much sounder basis in the policy of the
privilege and other important public policies than either the rule set-
tled on by the Court or the one proposed by the Independent Counsel
(and adopted by the D.C. Circuit). This proposed exception to the
posthumous privilege, which might be called the "suicide/destruction
of evidence" exception, would not work the broad impairment of the
privilege that the Independent Counsel's rule would have created and
that the Supreme Court majority feared. Moreover, like other excep-
tions to the attorney-client privilege, this one would be within the cli-
ent's control. The client can know in advance the circumstances un-
der which the client's voluntary action in the future (suicide) will
vitiate the privilege. The exception thus does not upset or balance
away, after-the-fact, reasonable expectations of the client concerning
the privileged nature of the communications. A client's mistaken ex-
pectation that the legal rule would be different (i.e., that the privilege
always survives death) could be corrected ex ante by competent legal
advice, once the exception became settled law. 27
126. This rule could perhaps be expanded to civil litigation as well. The Martin
case, for example, in which the New York court pierced the posthumous attorney-
client privilege in a case where the client's apparent suicide was directly relevant to
the ultimate legal issue, creates reason to believe that a persuasive case could be made
for expansion of the suicide/destruction-of-evidence exception to civil matters as well.
See Martin v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598-99 (Sup. Ct.
1988). For methodological reasons set forth below, see infra note 136 and accompa-
nying text, the Court in Swidler & Berlin need not (and should not) have resolved the
question of a suicide/destruction-of-evidence exception in the civil context, as it was
not presented by the facts of the case. In principle, however, if it is the client's wrong-
ful conduct, not the importance of the state's interest, that justifies an exception to the
posthumous privilege in criminal cases, it is difficult to see why the same result should
not obtain in civil cases.
127. Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 923 (8th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that a client's mistaken belief of law that communications would be privi-
leged does not transform unprivileged communication into privileged one).
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In this respect, the proposed exception is analogous to (but distinct
from) the "crime-fraud" exception, in terms of its policy justification:
the client's improper action, within the client's control, can result in
forfeiture of the privilege.' In the crime-fraud context, the improper
act is the use of legal advice in furtherance of crime.' 29 In the client-
suicide context, the improper act is the intentional destruction of evi-
dence through the taking of one's own life. To draw the analogy a lit-
tle more tightly: Just as it is the client's subsequent use of legal advice
to commit a crime or fraud that triggers the crime-fraud exception
(whether or not the client had such a plan at the time of the communi-
cations),u3o so too it is the client's subsequent suicide that triggers the
client-suicide exception (whether or not the client had contemplated
suicide at the time of the communications). In both cases, the privi-
lege is vitiated by a voluntary act within the client's control . 3 1 There
is thus no difficulty with the predictability of the privilege's applica-
tion.
In both cases, the client's voluntary act is also a wrongful act. (Even
where suicide is not a crime, that should not diminish the common
law's ability to treat suicide as wrongful, for purposes of analyzing
whether a privilege denying access to probative evidence in a criminal
proceeding should be recognized as continuing to exist.) In the crime-
fraud context, the attorney-client relationship is itself being abused by
the client for improper purposes. In the client-suicide context this is
not necessarily the case, but a wrongful act of another kind has been
committed if the suicide was (in part) designed to destroy access to
evidence. The dead client cannot be prosecuted for obstruction of jus-
tice; but he should not also be entitled to the attorney-client privilege
as to communications showing facts that otherwise could not be
known or proven because of the client's acts to "impede[] the due
administration of justice" by preventing the testimony of a witness.'1
The prosecutor should be obliged to make a showing, akin to that
128. A similar exception exists for a client's breach of a duty to his or her attorney.
The classic example is a dispute over nonpayment of fees. See Hazard et al., supra
note 46, at 280-84.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 566 (1989) (noting that there is
no privilege if communication was made in furtherance of a crime or fraud); In re
Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining conditions necessary for
crime-fraud exception).
130. See Ottoson, supra note 81, at 1340 & nn.64-65 (collecting authorities); see,
e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 50 (stating that "the government had to demon-
strate that the Company sought the legal advice with the intent to further its illegal
conduct").
131. I set to one side the case of an "involuntary" suicide, and presume that there is
a nontrivial category of cases in which suicide is a voluntarily chosen act by a person
not so affected by mental defect or illness as to be incapable of freely choosing to
commit suicide. An involuntary suicide should be treated the same as any other in-
voluntary death of the client. See supra notes 113-14.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) (federal obstruction of justice statute).
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made in the crime-fraud context, that in camera review may reveal
evidence showing that the suicide was motivated in part by a desire to
destroy access to evidence.133
Perhaps in few cases would this standard be met. But the salient
point here is that the Vince Foster case is one of those cases. As dis-
cussed above, there is a basis beyond mere speculation for believing
that Foster's suicide was affected by his legal/ethical conundrum, and
that the latter may have played a part in his motivation for taking his
own life."M It is entirely possible that the Independent Counsel could
have produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion of probable
cause, permitting an in camera inspection of Hamilton's notes (and,
further, in camera examination of Hamilton) to ascertain whether
there was a sufficient basis for concluding that Foster's suicide was a
knowing and intentional act of destruction of (testimonial) evidence,
in an attempt to circumvent his legal-ethical responsibilities.135
To be sure, there is a sense in which the client-suicide exception
seems tailor-made for the Vince Foster case. But that is how it should
be with case-by-case development of the common law of privilege:
the circumstances of a particular case suggest a policy justification for
a given rule; prior precedent supplies a baseline of practice and expe-
rience against which to judge the wisdom of that policy justification;
and uncertainty about circumstances not before the court, or unfore-
seen future cases, leads to a narrow formulation of the rule of the case
133. Or, as another commentator has suggested, an exception could be keyed to a
showing of a probable conspiracy in which the deceased was involved, and for which
evidence is sought against other conspirators. See Ottoson, supra note 81, at 1353-55.
With respect to the crime-fraud exception, courts have wrestled with the following
issues: (1) what constitutes a sufficient showing of likely crime or fraud to justify in
camera inspection by a court of the assertedly privileged communications or docu-
ments at issue; and (2) what constitutes a sufficient showing (upon in camera inspec-
tion) to defeat the privilege. The Supreme Court answered the former question in
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572. Zolin holds that in camera inspection may be made upon .'a
showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable per-
son' ... that in camera review... may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the
crime-fraud exception applies." Id. (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26,
33 (Colo. 1982) (citation omitted)). The answer to the second question has been for-
mulated in various ways. Many years prior to Zolin, the Supreme Court stated that
the standard for disclosure (i.e., to the prosecutor) is a prima facie showing of illegal-
ity. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933). Recent decisions by courts of
appeals have debated what is required to make out a prima facie showing of illegality.
Compare In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 46 (government satisfies its burden with re-
spect to showing crime-fraud where it 'offers evidence that if believed by the trier of
fact would establish the elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or fraud.' (quoting
In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985))), with In re John Doe
Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1982) (prima facie showing exists where there is
"probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud had been committed and that the
communications were in furtherance thereof").
134. See supra Part I.
135. The District Court examined Hamilton's notes in camera, but not with an eye
to the standard suggested here.
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(neither precluding nor predetermining the possibility of variations,
expansions, or revisions of that rule in future cases). Judicial devel-
opment of the common law should proceed with narrowly drawn
rules, narrowly tailored to the precise facts of the case at hand, rather
than with broad, categorical rulings not required by the facts of the
case. The common law is developed through patterns of cases, de-
cided with reference to their facts, which come to stand for general
propositions consistent with the patterns and holdings. It is an induc-
tive method, not a deductive one (as textual interpretation is, or at
least should be).'36
The client-suicide exception is a principled one, and sensible from a
policy standpoint. The fact that it likely applies only in relatively rare
circumstances is not a point against it; indeed, that is one of its virtues.
Unlike the D.C. Circuit's broad and loose exception for situations
where the client has died (of any cause, under any circumstances) and
the criminal justice system's need for the information is (on balance,
ex post) considered more important, the client-suicide exception does
not rip a hole in the fabric of the attorney-client privilege generally or
frustrate clients' knowable expectations concerning the scope of con-
fidentiality.
The Supreme Court's decision in Swidler & Berlin goes overboard
in the other direction, stating a categorical rule in favor of privilege
that was not only broader than required by the facts but in significant
tension with those facts. The attorney-client privilege survives the
death of the client, period, the Court said.137 The only exception left
open by the Court is the situation when a deceased client has con-
fessed to his lawyer information that would prevent a criminal accused
from being wrongfully convicted.138 Implicitly, the Court's holding
rejects any other theory, such as the client-suicide exception, under
which the claim of privilege might have been rejected on the facts of
the Vince Foster case. It is that holding of Sividler & Berlin-its
136. The approach to judicial development of the common law stands in marked
contrast to the deductive, formalist approach I have advanced elsewhere for constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch. Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. LJ. 217,226-27 (1994); Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of
the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 Yale LJ. 677, 721-33 (1993). This is because the
theory of what makes each body of law law is different: constitutional and statutory
authority proceeds from the premise that the text is law; common law proceeds from
the premise that the decisions of judges in cases, taken in aggregate, constitute the
law. (Indeed, it is the conflation of these two different conceptions of law, encour-
aged by legal training in the "common law" or "case" method of legal education, that
may explain a good deal of what ails "constitutional law" these days. But that is a
topic for another article.)
137. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,408-09 (1998).
138 See id at 408 n.3. Yet as noted above, two of the cases relied on by the Court
as support for its reading of the common law appear to protect the privilege even in
such circumstances. See supra note 118.
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sweeping, categorical acceptance of the posthumous privilege, re-
gardless of the circumstances-that is difficult to accept.
III. CONCLUSION: LEGAL ETHICS AT A CROSSROADS?
The Swidler & Berlin case is about privilege; but the Vince Foster
Case is about far more. Just as Swidler & Berlin probably had its
genesis in a classic dilemma of legal ethics, so too its ultimate impor-
tance may lie less in the Court's resolution of the privilege issue than
in the symbolic significance of Foster's apparent "resolution" of his
ethical dilemma. If the facts are as they appear, Foster, in the end,
failed to comply with his duties under the law. Instead he took his
own life and, in so doing, destroyed access to important evidence. In
the short term (and maybe in the long), the greater significance of
Swidler & Berlin likely will not be the evidence-law question of post-
humous privilege, but the Court's seeming ratification of Foster's
choice-and the powerful symbolic effect of that ratification on our
conceptions of legal professionalism.
In Swidler & Berlin, the life and death of a lawyer came to the U.S.
Supreme Court, five years after the fact, reduced to questions of
privilege and confidentiality. What secrets could remain hidden?
What truths could be left untold? The case offers no discussion of the
dilemma confronting an attorney presented with evidence of wrong-
doing by officials of the entity he serves as counsel (the problem for
which Foster probably sought legal advice). The case offers no discus-
sion of a lawyer's obligation to the truth-an obligation Foster evi-
dently took seriously enough that it created great emotional anguish
for him (and may well have contributed to his suicide). Noticeably
absent are the Burger Court-era lectures on professionalism, honesty,
integrity, and a lawyer's duties to the legal system' 39-aspects of the
ethos of the legal profession at the core of Foster's homily to the
graduates of University of Arkansas Law School just two months be-
fore his death. The case is about keeping clients' secrets secret after
they are dead. It is about nothing more than that.
There is something slightly odd about this, given that Vince Foster,
the client, was also Vince Foster, the government attorney in the mid-
dle of a serious ethical quandary that was the reason that Foster the
139. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164-69 (1986) (Burger, C.J.) (exten-
sively discussing legal ethics in course of rejecting claim of ineffective assistance);
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54 (1983) (Burger, C.J.) (discussing professional
judgment and responsibilities of lawyer in course of rejecting claim of ineffective as-
sistance); cf Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-10 (1989) (dis-
cussing professionalism issues in deciding question of statutory interpretation con-
cerning power of courts to appoint counsel in in forma pauperis proceedings);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (discussing benchmark for judging
effective counsel). The Mallard case is discussed in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After
Professional Virtue, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 213.
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lawyer became Foster the client. There is also something odd about
this, given the timing of the Supreme Court's decision-the summer of
1998. Questions of attorneys' duties to the legal system and to the
truth, and of government attorneys' public and professional duties not
to acquiesce in official wrongdoing, were central to the most promi-
nent of public legal controversies in 1998 (and continuing through
1999). The year of 1998 was a dramatic and potentially pivotal year
for legal ethics: It is almost universally agreed that the President of
the United States (himself a lawyer) made knowingly false and mis-
leading sworn statements in interrogatories, civil depositions, and
grand jury testimony over a period of no less than seven months;14
that the President apparently attempted to induce others to testify
falsely and in other ways apparently attempted to obstruct the truth-
seeking function of the judicial system; and that the President asserted
various legal privileges to attempt to prevent disclosure of facts that
would compel him to acknowledge earlier false statements."' In all of
this, in the resulting litigation over claims of privilege, and in the ex-
traordinary event of the impeachment and trial of a President of the
United States on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, the
President had the assistance of numerous attorneys-private and gov-
ernment attorneys-who helped him in the construction and presenta-
tion of his defense.142 President Clinton avoided conviction by the
Senate sitting as a court of impeachments. But the damage to his
presidency was palpable, and even now (this article goes to press in
140. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (holding
President Clinton in contempt for giving "intentionally false" testimony). For a thor-
ough and persuasive summary of the facts, see Richard A. Posner, An Affair of State:
The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton 16-94 (1999).
141. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After
Twenty-Five Years, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1344, 1384-89 (1999) [hereinafter Paulsen,
Nixon Now].
142. There is a not insignificant likelihood that President Clinton's attorneys, both
within and outside the administration, violated applicable ethics rules concerning
candor to the tribunal, assistance to unlawful client conduct, and/or presentation of
meritorious claims and defenses. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3.3,
1.2(d) & 3.1 (1998). Whether or not an ethical violation occurred turns on the extent
of actual or imputed knowledge on the part of the attorneys involved. If President
Clinton's private lawyers had knowledge that Clinton had presented, or intended to
present, or was in the course of presenting, false testimony or evidence, and failed to
take appropriate steps to correct or withdraw the presentation of known false testi-
mony, they acted unethically under the Model Rules. See id. But cf. Washington D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(d) (1997) (providing that a lawyer may not
knowingly present false evidence but that even a lawyer who subsequently receives
information "clearly establishing that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the tribunal"
has no duty to reveal the fraud if the client does not consent). Irrespective of the
ethics rules, such conduct may constitute criminal aiding and abetting of the underly-
ing perjury or obstruction of justice, and subject the lawyer to criminal liability. See
supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion of some of the legal ethics
issues associated with the lawyering in the Clinton-Lewinsky-perjury allegations mat-
ter, see Paulsen, Hel Handbaskets, and Government Attorneys, supra note 44, at 96-
106; Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 141, at 1383-84 n.132.
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the winter of 1999-2000) his legal jeopardy may not be over.143
Swidler & Berlin was decided in the midst of this extraordinary se-
ries of events and involved some of the same players.144 Yet the Su-
preme Court's decision makes no mention of these other matters.
Against the backdrop of these other scandalous, sensational events,
Vince Foster, Jr.'s possible ethical qualms and private angst seem,
somehow, sadly quaint, relative to the ethical issues that came later;
picayune, compared with the larger allegations of misconduct against
President Clinton and the steps that would be taken to defend against
them. Foster's dilemma, and Foster's death, can perhaps be taken as a
metaphor for the changing face of legal ethics during the 1990s-the
increasing irrelevance to real-life lawyering, and the ultimate demise
of a particular tradition of legal professionalism. One can almost
sense, in Foster's struggles, the struggle of a traditionalist professional
ethic of lawyering-the Arkansas Commencement Address Ethic of
integrity, truthfulness, and character-against the ascendance of a
new "post-modern" legal ethics of essentially unrestricted, no-holds-
barred combat on behalf of a client, irrespective of truth, candor to
the tribunal, fairness to opposing parties, and even the lawyer's possi-
ble complicity in unlawful conduct (as long as not provable). That
new ethic is perhaps best captured by a statement reportedly made by
President Clinton, when told by his pollster and political advisor Dick
Morris in January 1998 (shortly after the possibility of perjury and ob-
struction of justice by the President exploded into public view) that
instant polls showed the public would accept adultery, but not perjury,
by a President of the United States: "Well, we just have to win,
then."'45 On this view, law is about power and legal ethics is a func-
tion of ultimate success in obtaining one's objectives (or one's client's
objectives) without incurring sanction. There is no such thing as ob-jective truth. There are no objective constraints that a lawyer must
honor.
143. See Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 141, at 1370-73 (discussing Clinton's
amenability to criminal prosecution after he leaves office and arguably even while
President).
144. It is interesting, and somewhat perplexing, that Swidler & Berlin, argued on
June 8,1998 and decided (with extraordinary speed) on June 25, 1998, makes no men-
tion of the other privilege issues swirling around the Independent Counsel's investiga-
tion of the President at the same time: The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia had rejected President Clinton's claims of executive privilege and
governmental attorney-client privilege on May 27, 1998. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 1998). Clinton's lawyers filed a notice of ap-
peal to the D.C. Circuit on May 6, 1998. Independent Counsel Starr sought certiorari
before judgment on May 9, 1998. Although noting its expectation that the D.C. Cir-
cuit would proceed expeditiously, the Supreme Court denied the writ on June 4, 1998
(just four days before argument in Swidler & Berlin). See United States v. Clinton,
118 S. Ct. 2079,2084 (1998); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073,1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
145. Office of Independent Counsel, Referral to the United States House of Rep-
resentatives pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c), H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at 158 (2d Sess.
1998) (quoting grand jury testimony of Dick Morris, quoting President Clinton).
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This, of course, was not Foster's view (at least, it was not his view
before events in his own life began to spin out of control). Foster told
the graduates at Arkansas Law School two months before his death
that "[No victory, no advantage, no fee, no favor... is worth even a
blemish on your reputation for intellect and integrity." The "reputa-
tion you develop for intellectual and ethical integrity will be your
greatest asset or your worst enemy." 146
It would be an overstatement to say that the Vince Foster episode is
a defining event marking a paradigm shift in American legal ethics at
the close of the twentieth century; or that Swidler & Berlin, standing
on its own, supports sweeping conclusions about the changing ethos of
the legal profession; or even that a genuine paradigm shift (as op-
posed to certain short-term, temporary trends) is underway. But be-
neath the surface of the events discussed, between the lines of the Su-
preme Court's analysis, the Vince Foster case provides occasion to
consider what it means to be an ethical attorney. A part of Atticus
Finch died with Vince Foster.
In the same fashion, Foster himself may one day be seen as a transi-
tional figure in the paradigm shift from the post-Watergate era to the
post-modem era of legal ethics-a man caught in the middle not only
of a particular legal-ethical situation, but also of shifting conceptions
of lawyering and loyalty. One does not wish to impugn the good
name of a man whose death was a true tragedy and who apparently
wrestled seriously with what it means to be an ethical attorney. But
the test of Foster's commitment to his abstract principles came, and, in
the end, the burdens he felt were too great for him. Foster's biggest
professional and personal crisis came after he had been in law practice
for over twenty years, at what should have been the pinnacle of his ca-
reer as a lawyer, and at the height of his career prestige as Deputy
White House Counsel. Vince Foster's defining moment came, and he
killed himself. He carried his dilemma, his misgivings, and his secrets
to the grave.
Lawyers face such defining moments, great and small, of other
kinds, in all sorts of circumstances. The cumulative decisions made at
these moments-not the formal rules of ethics, not the law of privi-
lege, not even the decisions of the Supreme Court-ultimately are
what determine the character of the legal profession, and of the legal
system.
146. Reflections by Vincent Foster on Law and His Life, supra note 64.
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